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Papers





Iwona MASSAKA

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Selected Issues of E-Democracy and Political E-Participation

Wybrane problem e-demokracji i partycypacji politycznej

• Abstrakt •

Rozwój technologii informacyjnych i rozwój społeczeństwa sieciowego poskutkował rozwinięciem się demokracji elektronicznej. Nie może ona być traktowana jako jedna z form istnienia demokracji, gdyż jest zjawiskiem jakościowo od demokracji odmiennym, podobnie jak społeczeństwo sieciowe nie jest wirtualnym ekwiwalentem społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Wysunięto hipotezę, że rozwój technologii informatycznych być może polepsza w niektórych aspektach i skali stan demokracji, ale wyłącznie w przypadku gdy system jest realnie, a nie tylko deklaratorywnie demokratyczny w sytuacji wyjściowej, niezależnie od postępu technologicznego. Jednym z elementów konstytuujących demokrację, w tym partycypację polityczną, jest świadomość obywatelska. Cyberspołeczeństwo, stanowiące antymodel społeczeństwa obywatelskiego (Castells) realizuje w sieci potrzeby dyktowane przez konsumeryzm i świadomość konsumenta, a nie ethos obywatelski i świadomości obywatela. Zatem ocena dynamiki rozwoju e-demokracji w poszczególnych państwach nie powinna być podstawą wniosków o kondycji istniejącej tam demokracji.

• Abstract •

The development of information technology and the development of a network society have encouraged a rise of e-democracy. It can not be regarded as a form of democracy because it is a phenomenon qualitatively different from democracy, similarly the network society is not the virtual equivalent of a civil society. It has been hypothesized that the development of information technology perhaps improves the state of democracy in some aspects and to some scale, but only if the system is real and not just declaratively democratic in the initial situation, regardless of technological progress. One of the elements that constitute democracy, including political participation, is a civic consciousness. On the web, the cyber-society constituting the anti model of civil society (Castells) implements the needs dictated by consumerism and consciousness of the consumer but not the ethos of civic and citizen awareness. Therefore, the rating of e-democracy dynamics in individual countries should not be the basis for conclusions about the condition of the existing democracy there.

Słowa kluczowe: Internet, e-demokracja, partycypacja polityczna, społeczeństwo sieciowe, świadomość obywatelska

Keywords: Internet, e-democracy, political participation, network society, civic consciousness

The extremely dynamic development of media and information technology results in new phenomena in social and political spheres. They do not resemble previously known phenomena or situations with regard to possession and ways of functioning. To study these phenomena or situations, it is not only required for them to be formulated using adequate categories on a definitional level, but also to find new tools for examining the mechanism of their action. The informational model of democracy analysed by researchers as virtual, digital or electronic democracy, tel-democracy, cyber democracy and also cyber-society, network society, electronic society, etc., counts among the phenomena of this type (see: Snider, 1994; Percy-Smith, 1995; Loader, 1998; Moore, 1999). The definition of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, assumes that e-democracy takes place on three levels: informing, consulting, and active participation in political life. This type of democracy is considered to be a top-down action undertaken by local authorities and governments and, at the same time, a grassroots initiative undertaken in the network.

Electronic democracy is investigated as one of symptomatic aspects of existing and functioning of democracy today. Researchers regard electronic democracy as a form of direct democracy or technically improved version of representative democracy. Anyway, it is necessary to start the debate on a new type of democracy with emphasizing the fact that the development of information technology may improve some aspects and scale of the state of democracy, but only when the system is actually, not just declaratively democratic in the initial situation, regardless of technological advance. It is not the technology that creates democratic processes but the political will of the society. One should not deceive oneself that the dynamic development of new media, technological innovation, and also easier and easier access to any type of information could stop the global crisis of democracy. One factor that contributes to the crisis is the impairment of traditional political groups due to the fact that a part of power of competence was shifted to international institutions and the other part to local communities, which are not always able to reach their objectives efficiently. It results in an increasing skepticism towards politicians as well as participation in politics. Can new media and their potential overcome the scepticism to such an extent that active citizenship in the public sphere is increasing considerably? And if that is the case, can it be applied to making political decisions?

Studying the electronic democracy by means of tools used in description and research of democratic processes can deliver interesting results only if one determines the awareness of network society (see: Castells, 2007). Following the idea of e-democracy and the way it works resulting from that awareness. Differences between society and network society have been repeatedly described (Hagen) by mass communication science. It is beyond doubt that they present two dissimilar types of community, different with respect to their composition, ability to create interlinks, density, the degree of centralization and inclusiveness, and also their way of communication. Assuming a thesis that the electronic democracy is an attempt to implement representative democracy, we are not focusing on the instrumentalization of the democratic process or communication channels through which people exchange their opinions on the web, but on the awareness demonstrated by the network society, including political elites.

Democracy and Awareness of Citizenship – Interdependence of Coefficients of Incoming Crisis on a Global Scale

Politics in all democratic countries has changed into postpolitics – a media spectacle, in which political dissidents do not concentrate on real social needs, problems, and current tasks but on mutual intrigues and private interests, which are not always convergent with public interest. Many politicians are not engaged in solving actual social and political problems, they do not pursue politics in the sense that M. Weber argues for (Weber, 1987), but they continually spare no efforts to neutralize social energy so that it will not concentrate on the analysis of their identities. They do not listen attentively to the opinion of the democratic nation in order to turn its will into suitable political decisions; instead, they exert top-down pressure in a direct or more often manipulative way. Politics in most contemporary states defining itself as democratic and liberal comes down to incompetent camouflage of hidden steering, forcing bounds, and arbitrary decision-making about social and political matters (see: Karwat, 2012). In these circumstances, one should doubt in accurately developed awareness of citizenship of both political elites and the remaining participants of the processes. They are very often democratic in name only. The awareness of individuals that make up civil society should release their civil activity and Popper's openness (see: Popper, 1993), and it should also favour the development of associations that are of horizontal character. Yet, modern democratic societies show a lack of inclination to political participa-

tion and disappearance of horizontal associations, at the same time maintaining enormously well-developed but superficial horizontal communication, which is directed at particularistic objectives. One can draw a conclusion that the awareness of citizenship in these societies is poorly developed or it has disappeared. The development of the network and mass media in general does not raise the awareness of citizenship to a higher level but, on the contrary, it deepens the crisis. Civil ethos, which should be the foundation of democracy and its motive force, exists first of all as theoretical category, important for researchers engaged in theory of politics and political thought. Modern democratic societies have become more and more dependent on information technology and they are even fascinated with the possibilities made by it as far as communication is concerned. This way they are changing into network societies and, at the same time, information societies – focused on improving the use of information techniques and creating the communication structure which serves this purpose. Their main objective is to gain the most accurate information available as quickly as possible, which is the condition of competitiveness in the industry and services in postindustrial states (Negroponte, 1997; de Kerckhove, 2001; Wiczorek, 2007). If the awareness of citizenship in democratic societies had been low before the attempts to fulfill tasks typical of democratic societies took place, what is the awareness of citizenship in cyber-society, which is a qualitatively different formation but it is genetically connected with the society from before the development of the network? No democracy – either in the network and owing to it, or outside the network – cannot realize itself without the awareness of citizenship. Therefore, this question seems to be fundamental when it aims at evaluating benefits from the use of the Internet in the democratic processes.

Cyber-Society – a New Dimension or Anti-Model of the Civil Society?

In Castells's opinion, virtual communities are not real, physical communities and as such they are not subject to the same patterns of communication and interaction as physical communities. They cannot imitate other life forms existing outside the network. In this communities, there is no attachment to one's own territory, culture, and its specific cultural codes, which was typical of the societies from before the web development. Cyber-society is marked by the blurring of social identity, a-historicism, and a lack of connection with geographically specific place, which results in disappearance of social institutions and replacing them with the

idea of collective intelligence. We deal with departure from formalism and self-controllability. The identity of the Internet user is not determined in the context of their connection with a specific physically existing society, but in the context of their affiliation to “managerial information economy” of a global character (see: Kazanowski). The access to information is important, but willingness and ability to use information is even more important. The network society manages information, but in what way? In what way does it use information? Does the Internet give unlimited possibilities to manipulate political information or does it rather strengthen the possibilities of voter’s defence against mass media manipulation? (Castells, 2003). The issues of selection of information by a sender and a receiver and also susceptibility to manipulative work remain within the consideration of the awareness of citizenship shown by the network users. It becomes important to interpret correctly the intention followed by those who place substantially and temporarily defined information on the Internet, and to examine the receiver’s reaction to such information.

Cyber-society described by Castells is an anti-model of the democratic, civil and open society. In the context of Castells’ vision of the functioning of the Internet and the network society, it is impossible to mention citizen initiatives in the network and owing to it. However, those who conduct research on the Internet think that the network creates conditions for the emergence of professionally organized, leading to real effects citizen initiatives inspired by principles coming from consolidated democracies (Dorenda-Zaborowicz, 2013). In opposition to Castells, it is assumed that cyber-societies are not a separate and qualitatively different phenomenon from non-virtual societies but make up their sum functioning in the circumstances of extensive possibilities. These researchers assume that the tools employed by the civil society and known outside the network are also used in the network, and their organisers’ and participants’ motivations have not changed. The only thing that has altered is the range of influence and the repertoire of methods of aiming at intended objectives. It is difficult to question accuracy of Castells’ defining the cyber-society as amorphous and not assigned to any territory. However, according to the followers of the Internet vision as a medium and platform for democratic actions undertaken by citizens (in a classical and exemplary sense of the word), the global nature of the cyber-society by no means does not limit its actions in favour of maintaining or modification of state or/and national system. Even though the network society is morphologically conditioned by wider operating range than it is determined by the state border, besides the undertaken objectives are usually short-term and they are stable in a little degree, local affairs quite often appear in its range of interest.

Samuel Barber, although in a different way than Castells, believes that there are the same rules of public life both in cyberspace and outside it; in the 1990s, he finally shared Castells' s doubts concerning the cyber-society's predisposition to democratic actions. He questioned the thesis that computerization and digitization of democratic actions could increase citizens' interest in public affairs improving simultaneously the state of political participation in modern democratic states. In the middle of the 1980s, when the use of the Internet was not as widespread, Barber expressed his optimism about the usefulness of this tool for the improvement of the quality of democracy. His optimism resulted from the assumption that the cyber-society as one of the "embodiments" of the democratic society, not a different phenomenon both in respect to its quality and functioning, can develop its public activity through the network. At the same time, he advanced a thesis that cyber-society is some kind of civil society and as such it potentially has more possibilities to undertake civil activities than the society that does not use the Internet. However, this potential – as Barber stated – could be activated only at the time when a real transfer of decisiveness from the highest to lower levels of administration: local authorities and local communities comes into being. He rightly remarked that people think being active in the public sphere makes sense only when their arrangements are likely to reach irrespective of the ruling elites' standpoint or owing to these elites. In the last case, political elites really take public action into consideration creating legal basis for their implementation. If this democratic mechanism functions well, the Internet – as Barber wrote in the 1980s – could become a means for improving democratic processes allowing to present and confront the standpoints of all interested parties in a short time, formulate postulates concerning matters important for particular communities, present them to political elites and immediately get information about decisions on these matters. Such degree of democracy consolidation in particular states and serious commitment of the cyber-society's members in public affairs contribute to the possibility that the Internet could have fulfilled the hopes placed on it. Ten years later, Barber recognized their futility in the face of political realities – neither the establishment of particular states is prone to turn a lot of postulates propounded by citizens into adequate political decisions, nor – in connection with this – the citizens look upon the Internet as a politically efficient platform for promoting their own interests (Barber, 2003; Barber, 1998; see: Porębski, 2001). Such perversion of the democratic system at the bottom is important but not the only one reason for low efficiency of the e-democracy.

Citizen Initiatives on the Internet. The Potential Used Insufficiently

Researchers studying the citizen initiatives on the Internet (Vegh, 2003) discern several kinds of citizen initiatives, which altogether express commitment of at least part of the network users with their specific, locally important matters. The first dimension and axis of division are “old” and “new” forms of collective actions. The first of them belong to a repertoire of “old” types of activity, which are only improved by the network. The second kind of them are virtual activities taking place entirely in the network. They are based on the Internet as a whole, they do not exist without functioning in the network (Van Laer, Van Aelst, 2010). Research conducted by Marta Dorenda-Zaborowicz (Dorenda-Zaborowicz, 2013) showed that to the “old”, known before the period of the Internet development, traditional forms of support or involvement in the citizen initiatives belong:

- collecting donations from sponsors (through the Internet payment sites or click-to-give mechanism), at the same time product/make endorsement takes place, which in this case is this particular action;
- demonstrations – the network can serve as a channel of coordination and mobilization of participants who take part in street demonstrations. It mainly applies to the distribution of information about purposes and reasons of the action and also the logistics of a prepared action. The information about transnational and foreign demonstrations could also be placed on the websites;
- sit-in – a form of a direct action consisting in occupation of a territory in order to express protest or support for a case.

The civil actions taking place entirely in the network include:

- on-line petitions. They can be spread by social networking services. However, each user, even without the agency of such services, can create a profile regarding a specific issue where he expresses his/her attitude towards it and then spread it among other Internet users;
- spammers’ attacks consist in sending a big number of e-mails in a short time to people responsible for solving of the issue being the subject of the action. As a result, mailboxes and servers are blocked. Moreover, it reveals the strength of support for a given issue (Meikle, 2002). Another way of action /protest – the so-called “hacktivism” – is opening a specific website with such a frequency that the server it is put on cannot serve the number of questions and it finally crashes (du Vall, 2010);
- the websites of alternative media. The political and social matters published

and spread on these websites present a viewpoint different from this expressed in mass media.

Although this classification does not grant a place for such basic forms of civil activity as a debate (see: Porębski, 2013; Mider, 2008) and e-voting, it points at great possibilities of the Internet as far as activation of civil actions is concerned. However, the quantitative research conducted by the Polish researcher of political cyber-activity Dorenda-Zaborowicz leads to the conclusion that these possibilities are partially used by the Polish users of the network, most often by the agency of YouTube and Facebook services. The reason for this state of affairs is the degree commercialization of all aspects of life. It does not favour either the civil activity or even thinking over it. The Internet functions according to market rules and it subjected the users' thinking and activity to these rules a long ago. Both outside and in the network citizens are treated and function in accordance with a consumer's, not a citizen's logic. A consumer's awareness and a citizen's awareness are two different categories occupying the opposite poles. Discussion lists and citizen discussion forums have not disappeared from the Internet but they have been shifting to peripheries for a long time. "Public debates" about local affairs take place on the Internet forums but what is their range and level? Information about reality or local events are not a starting point for an activity which could be legitimately named a public debate. A debate is "a serious and long discussion on an important subject" (*Słownik języka polskiego*). The quality of discussions conducted on the Internet is bad, which results i.a. from their anonymity and the possibility of making or breaking contact any moment not taking the responsibility for the content of their statements. The lack of censorship is both its advantage and drawback. The cyber-society does not create the network of social engagement, it also does not establish norms, which facilitate coordination and co-operation. The principle of mutuality, which is the basis for social trust, does not work here. Putting it into Robert Putnam's words¹, the social capital of the cyber-society seems to be very low (see: Putnam, 1993). The groups coming into being on the Internet are unstable and amorphous in character. They have no one real place. Their meetings and talks in the network are of accidental, superficial character, they are not directed towards common and responsible performing of the tasks, including political tasks. Communication on the Internet is not subjected to any moral regulation, it assumes any form, sincerity is not always considered useful or

¹ R. Putnam studied the dependence between a very low level of social capital in American society, and withdrawing of its citizens into a private life. Americans to a lesser and lesser degree join social and political life, yet technological progress is continuously advancing in their country.

desirable. Many people think that for that reason it has the advantage over direct communication, outside the network. However, the lack of any setbacks or social and moral norms causes that opinions expressed on the Internet are often unconsidered, purposefully falsified, and excessively radical. An individual is not treated as a subject but more and more often as a thing, besides he/she is alienated, which is deadly for democracy.

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Canada – USSR Hockey Exchanges. Between Positive and Negative Sports Diplomacy*

**Kontakty hokejowe Kanada – ZSRR.
Pomiędzy pozytywną a negatywną dyplomacją sportową**

• Abstrakt •

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie dyplomacji hokejowej pomiędzy Kanadą a Związkiem Radzieckim, do jakiej doszło w latach siedemdziesiątych XX wieku. Obejmowała ona organizację szeregu meczów w hokeju na lodzie, których bezpośrednim celem było nawiązanie bliższych relacji pomiędzy dwoma należącymi do przeciwstawnych bloków geopolitycznych krajami.

W artykule podjęta została próba weryfikacji szeregu hipotez badawczych. Główna zakłada, iż dyplomacja hokejowa była w rzeczywistości połączeniem elementów pozytywnej i negatywnej dyplomacji sportowej. Zgodnie z kolejną, kontakty hokejowe były zarazem przejawem i narzędziem zbliżenia pomiędzy krajami, natomiast według ostatniej hipotezy wybór hokeja na lodzie jako narzędzia dyplomatycznego był adekwatny.

Słowa kluczowe: Dyplomacja hokejowa, dyplomacja sportowa, upolitycznienie sportu, stosunki Kanada–ZSRR

• Abstract •

The aim of the article is to investigate the issue of hockey diplomacy between Canada and the Soviet Union, which was held in 1970s. It encompassed a series of exhibition matches in ice hockey, which were directly aimed to improve relations between the two states belonging to different Cold War alliances.

In the article an attempt to verify a number of hypotheses was made. According to the main one, the hockey exchanges were in fact a fusion of positive and negative sports diplomacy. The second hypothesis states that hockey diplomacy was at the same time an effect and a tool of Canadian and Soviet desire to better their bilateral relations, while according to the last one, selection of ice hockey was adequate concerning the diplomatic objective of political rapprochement.

Keywords: Hockey diplomacy, sports diplomacy, politicisation of sport, Canada–USSR relations

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Introduction

The aim of the article is to investigate the issue of hockey diplomacy between Canada and the Soviet Union, which is an example of positive sports diplomacy directed at fostering positive objectives of states, for example rapprochement between hostile countries. The issue had received a fair interest among researchers worldwide, probably because of the great attention and symbolic meaning it gained in Canada, but in Poland it remained neglected in terms of scientific research. However, concerning its significance and influence on the evolution of this kind of sports diplomacy, it is worth to be undertaken as a research problem.

Sports diplomacy is defined in various ways, more narrowly or encompassing a vaster sort of diplomatic utilization of sport. The term is usually referred to concerning its role in shaping international image of a state and in fostering foreign policy goals. Those objectives may be either positive – directed at international cooperation and political rapprochement, or negative – directed at using sport for the sake of conflict and escalation of international tensions (Rowe, 2011; Saxena, 2011; Potter, 2009). Accordingly, sports diplomacy is sometimes described as either positive or negative. In the context of the use of sport in Canada – Soviet Union relations, generally sport has been employed as a tool of positive sports diplomacy, however according to one of the hypotheses, it actually included elements of negative sports diplomacy as well.

Sports diplomacy is generally considered as an element of a broader term – public diplomacy (Ociepka, 2013), which is defined as the communication of the policy of international actor to the people of another country (Pamment, 2013). Although in general the political elites also belong to the aims of public diplomacy, societies seem to remain as the main subject. This was a matter of Canada – USSR hockey diplomacy as well.

Hockey diplomacy between Canada and the Soviet Union is an example of positive sports diplomacy directed at international rapprochement. It must be noted though that ice hockey had been used for diplomatic sake by other countries as well, for instance in relations between the USA and the USSR. Nevertheless, it appears that Canadian – Soviet hockey exchanges were the most sophisticated and to greatest extent affected their bilateral relations. For this reason hockey diplomacy as a term is usually associated with relations between those two countries and this will be the object of the investigation.

In the research, an attempt to verify a number of research hypotheses will be made. According to the main assumption, the Canada – USSR hockey diplomacy was in fact a fusion of positive and negative sports diplomacy, even though the

positive aspects appeared to be dominating, particularly in the first period. The positive motivations encompassed most of all political rapprochement and enhancing the societies' perception in the second nation, while the negative aspects might be associated with the desire to gain international prestige by winning in the exhibition matches, obviously on the expense of the other participant. The second hypothesis states that the hockey exchange was at the same time an effect and a tool of Canada's and Soviet Union's desire to better their bilateral relations. Accordingly, hockey diplomacy was needed to bring the two states closer, but at the same time it was only possible after the political will for the detente appeared at both sides. Finally, the research is aimed to find out whether the selection of ice hockey was adequate concerning the positive diplomatic objectives of the sports contacts – it was, according to the final hypothesis. As a matter of fact, sports diplomacy directed at political rapprochement between unfriendly states is usually very fragile and any controversies that may appear in respect to the exchange may sometimes derail the whole diplomatic progress. This suggests picking minor sports for this sake, but at the same time such sports do not draw attention of the societies, which are the main objects of sports diplomacy.

The research is an empirical case study concerning one of the examples of sports diplomacy, generally aimed at improving the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Canada, two states belonging to opposing geopolitical blocks of states, with the use of athletic exchanges in ice hockey. The data was acquired with the use of existing, most of all historical elaborations on Canada – Soviet hockey exchanges by foreign authors and archives of media coverage. The acquired data were then analyzed with the use of decision-making method – in order to determine process of establishing sport exchange and the motivation of policy-makers, and hermeneutics – concerning the need to interpret the events and speeches of the engaged people from the perspective of positive or negative diplomatic and political meaning. The results of the research, apart from verifying the hypotheses, will help in searching for general regularities about sports diplomacy, contrary to most of the existing researches that tend to consider the issue individually.

Circumstances of Establishing Hockey Diplomacy

Ice hockey as a sport is very important in Canada, which as a matter of fact for many years had been dominating in international competitions. Some authors even suggest that this particular sport has contributed to the evolution of Canadian national identity, considering lack of common culture and language. Un-

der such circumstances, ice hockey might have been one of the very few factors uniting French and English speaking Canadians (Soares, 2007). Canada is also globally associated with this sport. As Evan Potter (2008) has noted, ice hockey has its role in defining international image of Canada – “northern, rugged, and determined” (p. 122). Despite all this, the results that Canadian national team was achieving in international competitions began to deteriorate in 1950s and 1960s. It can be associated with better performance of communist states in this sport, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. One of reason for this was that the best Canadian hockey players competed in professional league NHL, thus becoming professionals with no right to compete in prestigious international amateur competitions such as the Olympic Games or world championships. Meanwhile, in the communist states, sport was officially amateur only, although actually the best athletes were fictionally employed and could spend all their time on sport (Godlewski, 2009).

At this time, policy-makers in Canada became aware of the prestige damage resulting from the weak performance of the national team of Canada in ice hockey at the Olympics, world championships, and other tournaments organized in Europe (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). At the end of 1960s and the beginning of 1970s Canadians event suggested allowing professionals to participate in world championships. As a result of refusal by International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), Canada withdrew from the federation and the same time resigning from hosting world championships in 1970 (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994; Soares, 2008). Even before the mentioned withdrawal from international ice hockey competition, Canadian diplomats began to strive for organizing hockey exchanges between professional players from Canada and Soviet national team. At that time those strives were unsuccessful though (Fulbright Canada). Those events were very important concerning the future hockey diplomacy. At this time Canadian motivation was focused on restoring its prestige rather than improving relations with the Soviet Union.

Canadian policy-makers were aware of the damages of Canada's international image which were resulting from not participating in international hockey competitions and earlier from poor results in international events. The desire to improve the situation resulted in establishing a non-governmental organization Hockey Canada in February 1969, which was closely interrelated with the federal government. Its aim was to manage and develop Canadian national team and the sport in general, but the issues of national team were a priority. The organization has also begun to negotiate the country's return to international ice hockey competition (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994; Macskimming, 1996). The talks were to enable establishing hockey exchanges with the USSR soon. Hockey Canada can there-

fore be regarded as a tool used by Canada in order to use ice hockey for the sake of public diplomacy. Its aim was to increase the international prestige of the country and foster establishing closer relations with the selected states, in this case communist countries with the Soviet Union at the forefront.

From the time Pierre Trudeau became the Prime Minister in 1968, one of the main objectives of Canada's foreign policy was the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This was a part of a wider strategy which was to enhance Canada's sovereignty in international relations (Scherer, Duquette, Mason, 2007; Soares 2008; Scherer, Cantelton, 2013). Trudeau believed that as both countries were successful in ice hockey, it was logical to employ this sport in order to bring the two states closer (Soares, 2007). What is more, Soviet society was also enthusiastic about ice hockey, even though the country did not have traditions in this sport (Guoqi, 2008), especially in comparison to Canada. As a result, the sport seemed to be suited for the diplomatic objectives of the exchanges as they were awaking considerable interests among both societies. The Soviet Union was also positive about Canada's efforts to redefine the mutual relations, which was perceived as a possible way to settle relations with Western states on more predictable basis (Rudd, 2009).

In respect to his strategic objectives, Prime Minister of Canada Pierre Trudeau visited the Soviet Union in 1971 and met with Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin. The visit was regarded as very successful concerning the state of Canadian-Soviet relations. It resulted in signing of the Canadian-Soviet Protocol on Consultations and an umbrella agreement on economic co-operation. Shortly after, Prime Minister Kosygin was invited by his counterpart to visit Canada (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). The Protocol that has been signed seemed to be particularly significant though. Canadian authorities assessed it as a logical development of the process of diversification of Canada's foreign relations, which was understood as reducing the dependence from the United States and a will to better the relations with communist states of Eastern Europe (Soares, 2014). In the Soviet Union this was perceived as a chance to a partial relaxation of the Western alliance, although this was not the only aim of Canada's government, whose main motivation was improving its own position in international relations.

1972 Hockey Series

The development of diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and Canada encompassed the issue of ice hockey relations as well. Both sides agreed that sport formed a common bond between both countries, which could be used in order

to strengthen their relations (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). The whole concept of organizing a hockey exchange series was according to Roy Macskimming (1996) initiated by an article in Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*, in which it was mentioned that constant Soviet victories in ice hockey at the world championships and at the Olympics were boring and there was a need for new challenges. Canadian diplomats in Moscow considered it a suggestion and soon a meeting between the author of the article Boris Fedosov and employees of Canadian embassy in Moscow Gary Smith and Peter Hancock was arranged. During the meeting the Soviet side expressed a readiness to organize a series of matches between against Canadians playing in NHL. Earlier there was no permission for such an exchange. Apparently both sides were aware of the potential benefits of establishing friendly exchanges in ice hockey, both in terms of international image and political rapprochement. The further developments were dynamic.

The negotiations concerning the planned hockey series between Canada and the USSR were being held simultaneously with the talks between Canada and the IIHF concerning its return to international competition in this sport. Thanks to Soviet support Canadians managed to come to an agreement with the hockey federation during a meeting in Prague in April 1972. At the same time it was decided to organize a series of eight matches between teams from Canada and the Soviet Union, which were to be held in September that year (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). Half of them were to be played in different cities in Canada, while the other half in Moscow (Macskimming, 1996). The negotiated conditions of the series, according to observes, gave a certain advantage to the Soviets, as the matches were to be played at the NHL pre-season when players are usually in worse shape. The international rules that were agreed, according to which the games were to be played with two instead of three referees, also were believed to give some advantage to the Soviet team (Macskimming, 1996). The agreements concerning the series were suggesting that it can be used by the states in order to show their superiority, what could be used for the purpose of propaganda and potentially ruin the positive diplomatic significance of the series, as especially the Soviet side was trying to negotiate solutions giving its team a certain advantage.

The planned summit series was taken in Canada so seriously that a special unit was created in the Department of External Affairs – International Sports Relations Desk in the Public Affairs Bureau (Potter, 2009). The new organizational unit was responsible for preparation to the series, as well as negotiations and protocol issues (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). The stress put on the protocol can be interpreted as another proof of how Canada cared about using the sports exchange for the sake of political rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Just as planned, the hockey series between the national team of the Soviet Union and a Canadian NHL All-Stars team was held in 1972, in autumn (Soares, 2008). The Soviet squad appeared to be very well prepared. For example, as part of its preparations, in order to reduce the jet lag Soviet players for two weeks have been living according to Canadian time. Contrary, Canadians had some problems with even completing the best squad to Team Canada, as NHL teams did not want to let the players miss the preparations in order to play in the series. As a result, some players like Bobby Hull, Gerrie Cheevers, Derek Sanderson or J.C. Tremblay were not able to join Team Canada (Macskimming, 1996). Despite missing a few of their stars, Canadians were regarded as more likely to win in the hockey exchange as for the first time they were able to play against the Soviet Union with their professional hockey players. The exchange can therefore be regarded as a sort of realization of Canadian postulate concerning international hockey competition, which was rejected by the IIHF what eventually led to Canada's withdrawal. Of course it was a friendly series, but it could still bring benefits to Canada in the context of international prestige.

The first four matches were played in Canada, while the latter four in the Soviet Union. The whole summit series ended with a narrow win of the western American country, which secured its victory in an epic way – in the last seconds of the last match in Moscow. Canadian Paul Henderson scored a winning goal 34 seconds before the end of the game. On the whole, Team Canada won four matches, the Soviet Union won three and there was one draw. The series until today is regarded as one of the most important moments of Canadian sport (Soares, 2008).

Team Canada, on their way back home, played one more exhibition match in Prague against national team of Czechoslovakia, the other great hockey power. The match ended in a draw 3-3 (Team Canada, 1972; Podnieks, 2012). All those matches, apart from their public diplomacy dimension, were also treated as an opportunity to arrange meetings between diplomats and politicians. As Robert Ford, ambassador of Canada in Moscow recalled, those meetings together with the hockey series lead to a rise of the Soviet interest in Canada, thus improving the state of diplomatic relations (Macintosh, Hawes, 1994). It should be noted that positive sports diplomacy between unfriendly states very often encompassed arranging purely diplomatic talks on the occasion of sports contacts, even though such circumstances were not necessarily for such meetings.

As has been mentioned, there were concerns that the 1972 hockey series might be treated by both states as a tool to gain international prestige, regardless the political rapprochement. This actually happened and was exceptionally strong in Canada, but the Soviet Union was also motivated to win, although officially

its representatives claimed that the matches were friendly only and that Soviet team played in order to learn, not to win (Macskimming, 1996). It should not be a surprise that after the last winning match in Moscow Prime Minister Trudeau sent a telegram, in which he congratulated Canadian players and at the same time mentioning, that during the match “all regular activity was put on hold” (CBC, 1972). Till now the hockey series is regarded as one of the most symbolic and mythical events in the history of Canada (Wechmann, 2007). Although Canada won, actually both sides could benefit from the series in terms of international image. Canadians, by winning, recovered their national prestige and honour, while the Soviet Union amateur national team could be proud to lose only narrowly with a team of All-Star professionals. Soviet officials were also suggesting that their national team was in fact better, while the Canadians compensated it only with aggression and violence on ice (Soares, 2007). Apparently both sides were treating the exchange as a matter of national prestige, but at the same time such rhetoric remained low-profile.

Although both states were trying to use the 1972 hockey series for the sake of national prestige and were striving to win it, it should not be forgotten that the most important aim of the exchange was to bring the countries from competitive geopolitical blocks closer. Diplomatic significance of the series was strongly emphasized by both sides, not only by the Canadians. One of the Soviet diplomats was reported to have said, that “with Canada we are looking to a mutual design of friendship through hockey” (Scherer, Duquette, Mason, 2007, p. 172–173). The series was also meant to influence both societies according to the assumption that more people are interested in sport than in international relations (Scherer, Cantelon, 2013). Such attitude is typical for public diplomacy, a category that includes sports diplomacy.

Apart from the aspects of positive sports diplomacy which at this time were apparently dominating in the hockey series, there were also some obstacles. Apart from the issue of the desire to win for the sake of prestige, it was the aggressive style presented by Canadian players. Numerous fouls were leading to a situation that sometimes matches instead of friendship were evoking hostility towards Canadians. For example one of the Canadians have made a throat-slitting gestures at his rivals, while another was to intentionally break one of the Soviet player’s ankle after he was instructed to do so from the assistant coach. Of course the Soviets were not totally blameless and were fouling as well (Soares, 2008), but it were the Canadians who were remembered as particularly violent.

The style of play in NHL was generally more aggressive than in international amateur events, but the level of violence was even greater during the 1972 series,

probably due to the pressure that was being put on the players, as they were expected to “uphold both national honor and professional credibility”. Moreover, the players themselves were treating the matches in an emotional way – one of them was reported to have said that the matches symbolized a war between “our way of life against the communist way of life” (Soares, 2007, p. 214). As Canadian Rod Gilbert has said, “we couldn’t lose this series. It was the most incredible pressure I’ve ever been under” (Kreiser, 2012). All those quotes show that despite positive diplomatic aim of the hockey exchange, directed at political rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Canada, the Cold War dichotomy was very clear, especially in the attitudes of the players and in the fact that both states were trying to use the series for the sake of international prestige.

The government of Canada seemed to be aware of the potential threats to the diplomatic dimension of the series. In order to avoid the negative consequences of players’ violence and the desire to win, a stress was being put on the ceremonial aspect of the exchange (Wechmann, 2007). This was one of the aims of creating the mentioned International Sports Relations Desk. In general, the 1972 hockey series was assessed ambiguously, but authors seem to agree that the benefits for Canada were dominant. The general policy of Prime Minister Trudeau gave the country greater appreciation in the Soviet Union and made the state more visible (Wechmann, 2007). The summit series was probably one of the factors that enabled it.

Continuation of Canada – USSR Hockey Diplomacy

Researches analyzing Canadian-Soviet hockey diplomacy tend to focus on the 1972 summit series that has been presented above. Nevertheless, exchanges in ice hockey were continued in the aftermath. Taking into consideration their diplomatic objectives – bringing the two states closer, they should also be put to the category of hockey diplomacy and therefore should be at least mentioned. The second hockey series was organized two years after the previous one. However, the prestige that was associated with it seemed to be smaller, similarly to the diplomatic significance.

In 1974 a new North American professional ice hockey league World Hockey Association (WHA), which was meant to be a competition to famous NHL, organized a series of matches between Canadians playing in the league and the national team from the Soviet Union. The format of the series was similar to the one in 1972 – four matches in different cities in Canada and four matches in Moscow. The agreement regarding the series was signed during the IIHF congress in

Helsinki, in March 1974. Although Canadian government was aware of the lower profile of the projected series, its main objective was similar as before – enhancing the bilateral relations, although there were also voices that WHA's aim was also to improve its status (Soares, 2014; Scherer, Cantelon, 2013). The series ended with a Soviet victory – four matches were won by the USSR, there were three draws and the WHA team won one match. This was a surprise, as despite lower prestige than NHL, there were also very good players in the WHA team, who took part also in the 1972 series (Soares, 2014, 2007).

According to John Soares (2014), the 1974 series fit to Pierre Trudeau's aims to improve relations with the Soviet Union and reduce Cold War tensions, while Canada's Ministry of External Affairs considered the series as "obviously important" (p. 2) to the relations between the two states and "extraordinary opportunity to project Canada's image in the USSR of which we should take full advantage" (p. 2). The statements confirm the assumption that the 1974 series, although less known, should also be regarded from the perspective of sports diplomacy.

Organization of the series was not easy despite official political will. Certain IIHF officials for various reasons were opposing it, there were also problems with settlements concerning travels, while violence between players was leading to official diplomatic interventions. Some of the controversies were so serious that there was a risk of aborting the series, for example after Canadian team chartered a plane instead of using public airlines for traveling between cities in Canada, as was negotiated before the series. On the other hand, Canadian officials boycotted one of the matches in Moscow as a consequence of dissatisfaction of the seats that were granted to them. In the report by the Canadian embassy in Moscow it was even stated that provided that the 1972 series probably improved the relations with the Soviet Union, it is very hard to be definite in assessing the diplomatic meaning of the second series (Soares, 2014). As can be seen, although the problems of the 1974 series were similar to those two years before, their influence on the diplomatic impact of the hockey diplomacy appeared to be greater.

The hockey series in 1972 and 1974 between amateurs from the USSR and professionals from Canada are the best known acts of hockey diplomacy, but there were also other exchanges in ice hockey that deserve to be noted. For example, in winter 1975–1976 two Soviet hockey teams CSKA Moscow and Soviet Wings traveled to North America in order to play exhibition matches against American and Canadian teams. During one of such games the best Soviet team, national champions CSKA Moscow played against Montreal Canadiens, a team that won the Stanley Cup four consecutive times between 1976 and 1979. The match, played in Montreal Forum, ended in a draw 3-3. The game was assessed as one of

the finest hockey games ever played (IIHF, 1975). Then, in 1976, Canada hosted the first of a whole series of Canada Cup tournaments, in which national teams from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well as teams of professionals from the USA and Canada (occasionally also from Sweden) competed. In turn, in February 1979, another series Challenge Cup was established, which encompassed three matches between the NHL All-Stars and Soviet national team. After the first two games there was a draw, but the final match was won by Soviets 6–0. The result was perceived by some Canadians as the “loss for democracy” (Soares, 2008, 82; Soares, 2007, 221), albeit it was a match between the Soviet Union and a joined American-Canadian team. Those hockey exchanges also could be considered as elements of a wider Soviet-Canadian hockey diplomacy. Hockey exchanges were continued then, but it appears that their positive diplomatic significance was decreasing and never reached the level of the 1972 series, although most certainly the simple fact of maintaining sports contacts must have affected the mutual perception of the two societies.

Conclusions

Canadian-Soviet hockey diplomacy, and its narrow perspective that encompass the 1972 summit series in particular, are usually assessed to have revealed the great potential of sports diplomacy, while sport began to be perceived as a innovative diplomatic tool, especially in Canada (Lavery, 2010). This statement appears to be a little exaggerated as for example the most famous act of sports diplomacy – the ping-pong diplomacy between the USA and China was held earlier. Nevertheless, it was the first such act in Canada, a country that is now famous for its well-developed sports diplomacy. What is more, sports exchange was not a prerequisite of the further diplomatic contacts between the Soviet Union and Canada, as it was negotiated on the intergovernmental level.

According to Xu Guoqi (2008), the success of Trudeau’s hockey diplomacy convinced him to make use of sport also in contacts with other states, for example with China – in the connection with the Summer Olympics in Montreal in 1976. In this respect it should be considered whether hockey diplomacy should in fact be assessed as a success, concerning that there were also some aspects that undermined the positive diplomatic effects of the exchanges. As it appears, regardless all the controversies, particularly concerning the violence between players, Canada – USSR hockey diplomacy should be evaluated positively. Canada managed to find its place in Soviet concepts concerning international relations and, most of all,

became more visible in Soviet society. From this point of view, hockey exchanges have fulfilled their role.

The investigation of hockey exchanges between the Soviet Union and Canada allowed to confirm the hypothesis stating that hockey diplomacy between the two states was in fact a fusion of positive and negative sports diplomacy. Accordingly to all the political objectives, exchanges in ice hockey were obviously aimed at political rapprochement between both countries and there is no doubt about that. However, both sides apart from political cooperation were struggling to win for the sake of prestige. The desire to win on one side is connected to the branding role of sports diplomacy, but this case appeared to go beyond simple nation-branding. As a matter of fact, hockey victories were also regarded from the political perspective, which could be seen for example in speeches of the players or in their violent behavior on ice. There were also clashes concerning the organizational issues. Concerning those contexts, hockey exchanges were encompassing elements of negative sports diplomacy as well, even though they were probably less significant than the positive ones.

Another of the hypotheses that was tested stated that hockey exchange was at the same time an effect and a tool of Canada's and Soviet Union's desire to better their bilateral relations. As has been noted, Canada had been proposing hockey exchanges for a while before it was finally realized. Only after détente in East – West relations flourished and when Pierre Trudeau became the Prime Minister of Canada the exchange became possible. To that extent the hockey diplomacy was an effect of better bilateral relations. On the other hand, the hockey exchanges were directly aimed at bringing the states even closer. Bearing this in mind, the hypothesis has been confirmed as well.

According to the last hypothesis, hockey was a well-chosen sport for the sake of sports diplomacy. This hypothesis has been confirmed only partly. The sport was globally associated with Canada, so it was a natural medium for its public diplomacy. The sport was also popular in both societies and as a result the exchanges were receiving a great deal of attention. From this perspective the choice of the sport was good. On the other hand, contacts in such sport were risky as both sides might have wanted to use them for the sake of national prestige, which actually happened. Losses were evoking negative feelings, which were amplified by violence on ice. This was particularly strong in Canada, where ice hockey is regarded as a national sport. Those risks were partly reduced by the fact that the matches were played by Soviet amateur national team and Canadian professional All-Stars teams or simply by teams from professional leagues. The exchanges were therefore encompassing duels between teams that could not meet in the official competi-

tion, giving the loser a credible justification for his loss. Concluding, the choice of ice hockey was good, but not perfect.

Investigation of hockey diplomacy between Canada and the Soviet Union allowed to make a few observations. Firstly, all the major exchanges were arranged directly by non-governmental subjects. This is typical for public diplomacy and at the same time it is useful when relations between two states are sensitive. Employing such actors reduces the governments' risk of losing prestige if the initiative fails. At the same time, all the exchanges were negotiated on an intergovernmental level – Canada even created a special organizational unit responsible for the hockey exchanges. This proves that the exchanges despite a grass-root character were embodying inter-state diplomacy.

Another observation that has been made refers to the motivation of the Canadian side. Establishing sports exchanges with the Soviet Union were directly aimed at political rapprochement with this Cold War superpower, but there have also been deeper motivations. First of all, Canada under Pierre Trudeau was searching for a stronger position in international environment. Closer ties with the USSR were seen as a chance to receive greater independence internationally. The other motivation of Canada was to gain national and international prestige, which suffered from losses in international hockey and eventual withdrawal from IIHF. Hockey exchanges with the Soviet Union gave Canada a chance to fulfill both of these goals.

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Destroying the National-Spiritual Values of Ukrainians during the Anti-Religious Offensive of the Soviet Totalitarian State in the 1960s and 1970s

**Niszczenie wartości narodowo-duchowych Ukraińców
podczas anty-religijnej ofensywy sowieckiego państwa totalitarnego
w latach 60. i 70. XX wieku**

• Abstrakt •

Artykuł zajmuje się kościelnym i religijnym życiem Ukraińców w kontekście narodowościowych i politycznych procesów mających miejsce w latach 60. i 70. XX wieku. Autorka prezentuje charakterystykę anty-religijnej polityki rządu radzieckiego, pokazuje jej kierunki, formy i metody, bada stosunek przedstawicieli tytularnego narodu wobec prześladowań religijnych i manipulacji świadomością religijną przez przywódców komunistycznych i podkreśla kompleksowość działań ateizacyjnych i eliminację możliwości odrodzenia religijności wśród ludzi. Autorka odsłania istotę, proces tworzenia i sztucznego egzekwowania nowego radzieckiego rytualizmu w życiu Ukraińców. Ten rytualizm stał się wygodnym narzędziem do popularyzacji ideologii komunistycznej w Ukraińskiej SRR, niszcząc pamięć historyczną i osłabiając tożsamość narodową narodu ukraińskiego. Nowy radziecki rytualizm był również narzędziem do realizacji polityki denacjonalizacji Ukraińców, poczynając od odwiecznego zwalczania ukraińskich zwyczajów, tradycji i rytuałów. Model polityki pań-

• Abstract •

The article deals with the church and religious life of Ukrainians in the context of national and political processes during the 1960s and 1970s. The author characterizes the anti-religious policy of the Soviet government, shows its directions, forms, and methods, studies the attitude of Ukraine's title nation representatives to religious persecution and to manipulation of religious consciousness by the communist leadership, and highlights comprehensive atheistic activities and the elimination of the ways for reviving religiosity among people. The author reveals the essence, the process of creating and artificially enforcing the new Soviet ritualism in Ukrainians' lives. This ritualism has become a convenient tool for popularizing communist ideology in the Ukrainian SSR, destroying historical memory and undermining the national identity of the Ukrainian people. The new Soviet ritualism was also a means for implementing the policy of denationalizing Ukrainians, beginning with the age-old religious oppression of Ukrainian customs, traditions, and rituals. The model of state-church policy of the Soviet

stwa wobec wspólnot religijnych reprezentowany przez władze radzieckie w omawianym okresie był oparty na wykorzystywaniu różnorodnych form i metod walki z religią, włączając w to: kompleksową kontrolę nad działalnością duchowieństwa, niszczenie miejsc kultu religijnego i obiektów sakralnych, a także wywieranie administracyjnej, moralnej i politycznej presji na wierzących. Wypierając religię, radzieckie państwo totalitarne niszczyło nie tylko rodzime zwyczaje religijne narodu ukraińskiego, ale również podminowywało fundamenty wielowiekowej kultury i osłabiało narodową odrębność Ukraińców.

Słowa kluczowe: ukraińskie wartości narodowo-duchowe, stosunki państwo-Kościół na Ukrainie, kampania antyreligijna, opozycja, prześladowanie religijne, propaganda ateistyczna, państwo totalitarne

power in the described period was based on the use of a variety of forms and methods of struggle against religion, including: a comprehensive control over clergy activities, destruction of religious sites and sacred objects, as well as administrative, moral, and political pressure on believers. Displacing religion, the Soviet totalitarian state destroyed not only native religious customs of the Ukrainian people, but also violated the principles of the centuries-old traditional culture and undermined the national fortitude of Ukrainians.

Keywords: Ukrainian national-spiritual values, Ukrainians' state-church relations, anti-religious campaign, opposition, religious oppression, atheistic propaganda, totalitarian state

Formulation of Scientific Problem and Its Significance

Religion and the institution of church have always been a spiritual and ideological factor of consolidating the Ukrainian nation; it served as a means of national self-expression and traditionally played an important role in the cultural, social, and political life of Ukrainians. However, the religious sphere in the Soviet Ukraine period was suddenly broken by atheism. It rejected everything that has been traditional in the Ukrainian society for centuries. The eradication of the Christian worldview began. In this context it should be noted that the 1960s and the 1970s were characterized by the destruction of religious consciousness and religious worldview of Ukraine's title nation, the review of ideas about the church, the closing of churches, and the national oppression of Ukrainian authenticity and identity. The concept of Christian morality was not included into the ideological framework of the ruling party system. Communist authorities directed all their efforts to destroy the church as a social institution, which led to deep strains in public and personal spheres of the Ukrainian people's lives. The Soviet times were a cruel test of strength of the Ukrainian national character and its capacity for an independent state-building.

The Ukrainian state gained its independence. It caused a democratization of the political life of the society, opened access to many archival sources, and created favorable conditions for free, fair, considerate, and methodological study of the

Soviet past of the Ukrainian people as well as rethinking their history, especially the history of the church.

Nowadays there is an increase of public interest in religion as an insufficiently studied socio-cultural phenomenon. A comprehensive study of religious issues, such as the national-spiritual values of Ukrainians during the anti-religious offensive of the Soviet totalitarian state in the 1960s and 1970s always retains its relevance and interest of researchers and requires a special approach in the study. A thorough analysis of atheistic propaganda during this period gives an opportunity to understand and explore the modern, post-atheistic period and to find answers for many questions that arise as a result of the reduction of religiosity among the people of independent Ukraine.

Research Analysis

The Ukrainian people's church and religious life in the second half of the 20th century is partially explored in the papers of such authors as: I. Andrukhiv (2011), V. Baran and V. Danylenko (1999), V. Vovk (2007), G. Marynchenko (2013), V. Marchuk (2004), A. Mykhalchuk (2008), V. Pashchenko (2001), P. Slobodiak (2000), A. Tievikova (2007), and others.

The scientists only studied some aspects of the issue, including: an overall description of the atheization of Ukraine during the Soviet period, the study of anti-religious propaganda by means of film and radio in the period of the Khrushchev's Thaw, the analysis of legal guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion by the communist regime, the study of the emergence of religious non-conformism, and the clarification of church-state relations and the status of certain denominations in the outlined period. However, the issue remains not studied enough in scientific literature. This enables us to continue working in this perspective area.

The Aim of the Article

Thus, the focus of this article are: the destruction of national-spiritual values of Ukrainians during the anti-religious offensive of the Soviet totalitarian state in the 1960s and 1970s, the struggle of the Soviet government against church institutions, the attitude of Ukraine's title nation's representatives to anti-religious campaign in the republic, and the influence of the religious factor on Ukrainians' national self-identity in the outlined period.

The Main Material and Justification of Study Results

In times of the totalitarian regime in the Ukrainian SSR the struggle for influence on Ukrainians' consciousness was one of the main political directions of the Soviet authorities. That is why the Communist Party directed their political activities against the church as an centuries-old integral part of the Ukrainian people's spiritual life. The religious issue was very important for the Ukrainian SSR leadership. In 1961 the ruling party declared the policy of "building a communist society", which did not provide space for religion. It was the destruction of the religious consciousness of Ukraine's title nation's representatives, the artificial substitution of communist ideology for religion, and the unification of social, political, church and religious life of Ukrainians according to common Soviet models.

The religious palette in Ukraine in the 1960s consisted of about 40 religious denominations (*The Issues of Scientific...*, 1963, p. 394). The Russian Orthodox Church took a dominant position in the republic. The Russian Orthodox Church operated legally and was supported by the government. Other church communities were considered sectarian groups. The Soviet government tried to strengthen the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially in the western region of Ukraine dominated by Greek Catholics. In Ivano-Frankivsk region as of 1 November 1963, 55 former priests of the Greek Catholic Church refused to move into the Orthodox faith and continued their religious activities. That is why they suffered persecution and oppression (*State Political Publishing House...*, 1962, p. 96).

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church continued its development in the underground in order to maintain support for Ukrainians' national consolidation in times of religious persecution. The process of the return of the priests forced to accept orthodoxy started on the initiative of the underground head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church V. Velychkovsky. "Velychkovsky called certain priests to break with orthodoxy and move to the side of the Vatican" – reported the commissioner of the committee for the Russian Orthodox Church in Kiev V. Sukhorin with concern (April, 1964; Marchuk, 2004, p. 244). At the end of the 1960s, 144 Greek Catholic priests and more than 200 monks from liquidated monasteries lived in Lviv (Marchuk, 2004, p. 246). Under these circumstances government institutions made a number of important decisions concerning the struggle against "illegal activities of Uniate churches and sects" and Ukrainian religion in general. In 1969 the bishop V. Velychkovsky was arrested. Famous priests P. Gorodotsky and R. Bakhtalovsky were arrested in Lviv and Kolomyia. Searches in the bishop V. Sterniuk's and dozens of other priests and monks' apartments were made (Marchuk, 2004, p. 247). Many churches were removed from the registry.

The offensive on religion has been continued over the next years. The Committee for State Security of the USSR widely applied provocations to discredit the Greek Catholic hierarchy. The Soviet authorities developed anti-religious, especially anti-Uniate, museums and galleries in 70 closed churches of the western region to make an ideological influence on the Ukrainian people (Pashchenko, 2001, p. 306). Unauthorized opening of Uniate churches was punishable by up to 10 years of imprisonment (Marchuk, 2004, p. 247). The ideological clichés about “anti-social criminal activities of Uniates” and “their ties with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists and Nazi punitive bodies” were propagated in the mass-media and some scientific journals (Andruxhiv, 2006, p. 25). Regarding the awakening of national consciousness as a direct threat to the existence of totalitarian communist regime, the Soviet authorities used arrests and other repressive actions (Marchuk, 2004, p. 248). Despite the oppression and persecution, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church continued their opposition activities and raised the religious consciousness level of Ukrainians preparing them for practical work in the field of nation-building. In Western Ukraine in general there was a higher degree of religiosity and conventional religious traditions in comparison with other regions of the republic during the studied period. Thus, the anti-religious campaign had a mass scale here.

A large-scale anti-religious struggle was also carried out against various illegal Protestant communities, especially the communities of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and others. In 1962 there were 560 communities (14 470 persons; Bondarchuk et al., 2012, p. 164). They were attributed to religious sacrifice, accused of sexual perversion and espionage, publicly ridiculed, and called criminals and mentally ill (Bondarchuk et al., 2012, p. 166). Between 1961 and 1964 74 believers were convicted in the Transcarpathian region, 29 – in the Rivne region, 24 – in the Odessa region, 25 – in the Kharkiv region, and 20 – in the Chernivtsi region (Slobodianiuk, 2000, p. 161). Religious belief in the totalitarian state was considered a criminal offense.

The Communist government implemented the new legislation on cults, which legally secured a total attack on religion and violated the constitutional rights of believers. These were the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union *On the goals of party propaganda in modern conditions* (9 January 1960) and *On measures to eliminate violating Soviet legislation on cults by the clergy* (13 January 1960; on 19 March 1960 the similar resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine), the resolution of the Minister Council of the USSR *On strengthening control over the implementation of legislation on cults* (16 March 1961; on 29 April a similar decree was

adopted by the government of the Ukrainian SSR), the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine *On the state and measures to improve scientific and atheistic education of workers in the Ukrainian SSR* (9 October 1962), and others (Proceedings No. 26 of the Meeting..., 1962, pp. 31–36). The aforementioned legislative decisions of the communist authorities contributed to the reduction in the number of religious institutions and priests, the removal of religious associations from registration, the closing of monasteries, the reduction of the list of sacred monuments by half, and the destruction of a large number of chapels and roadside crosses (Information of the Departments..., 1967, p. 168).

For example, in the report of the commissioner of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Stanislav region *On roadside crosses* (July 20, 1961) it was stated that 890 commemorative crosses and 93 chapels considered “religious remnants” had been removed on the territory of 12 districts during six months (Andruxhiv et al., 2011, p. 22). Many of these “remnants” had not only religious, but also historical significance, because they were symbols of the abolition of serfdom, the 950th anniversary of the baptism of Rus-Ukraine, the memory of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and other important events. However, they were considered “visible church propaganda” and subject to liquidation. Defunct churches were reorganized into cultural institutions (clubs, cinemas, gyms) or warehouses for storing fuels, fertilizers, coal, grain, and other agricultural products. Other churches were left empty and destroyed.

The next stage of total atheization of Ukraine’s title nation and the struggle for eradicating any demonstration of religiosity in Ukrainians’ lives was the creation and artificial introduction of the so-called new Soviet ritualism, which was designed to speed up the implementation of the Soviet policy of denationalizing Ukraine’s title nation and forming a model of a Russified Soviet citizen without national identity. It was based on the principles of the communist ideology, which glorified the existing state system and reflected material and spiritual values inherent in the mentality of the Soviet people, causing destruction of age-old traditional customs and rituals of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian native church-religious and folk customs were traditionally interpreted as “remnants”, archaic and even reactionary elements of the Soviet life. “... Ukraine has become a springboard for the most brutal internationalization: defamation and prohibition of our customs and rituals, language, songs, religion, life, morality and common law – just what Ukrainian people traditionally lived and were proud of” (Kryvchyk et al., 2003, p. 87).

Religious holidays were officially opposed to new Soviet holidays: anniversaries of collective and state farms, work and harvest holidays, the anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin’s birthday, the day of the Soviet Army, and others. It

should be emphasized that the Soviet rites were rarely held in Ukrainian language. Celebrations in the Ukrainian SSR and other republics were similar and limited to setting state flags and solemn oaths of allegiance to communist ideas and the cause of the Communist Party (Onufriychuk, 2015, p. 93).

However, Ukrainians continued to celebrate major religious holidays – Palm Sunday, Easter, Christmas, Epiphany, Trinity, and others, regardless of the dominant atheistic ideology. Considering this fact, it was noted in the resolution *On the goals of party propaganda in modern conditions* (9 January 1961), that local party organizations did not react properly to demonstration of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. “They sometimes take a passive stance towards antagonistic to Marxism Leninism, idealistic, religious ideology”; that is why local party officials were required to strengthen the struggle against religious remnants (Andrukhiv et al., 2011, p. 19). For example, the Soviet leadership saw demonstration of “bourgeois nationalism” in Ukrainian Christmas carols and New Year songs. On 20 December 1972 the Committee of State Security at the Minister Council of the Ukrainian SSR reported “top secretly” to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine that “some nationalist individuals, mostly among former members of the choir ‘Homin’, took measures to hold so-called ‘Christmas carols’... as one of the legal forms of engaging new people to the ‘Ukrainian movement...’”, because of the phrase in the text of one of the carols: “Lord, give freedom to Ukraine!” (Danylenko, 2013, p. 344). Thus, the Committee of State Security at the Minister Council of the Ukrainian SSR considered it necessary to take measures to prevent possible attempts to use carols for Ukrainian nationalists’ antagonistic purposes (Danylenko, 2013, p. 345).

Soviet ritualism with its distinct character of atheism was popularized by communist ideologists by means of the mass-media. Radio and newspapers did everything to “expose the reactionary essence of religion and sectarianism, equip workers with materialistic understanding of natural and social phenomena” (Reports of Regional Committees..., 1969, p. 19). The most popular atheist radio programs imposed on Ukrainians were *Let’s talk about marriage and wedding ceremonies*, *How I broke with religion*, *Belief in divination and its harmfulness*, *Science of the origin of life on Earth*, *Religious holiday “Easter” and its essence*, *The strength is not in God, but in a man*, *Communist and religious moralities*, etc. (Marynchenko, 2013, p. 144).

Film studios were also involved in the anti-religious campaign. For example, the Dovzhenko Odessa Film Studio produced a number of short films that ridiculed religious narrow-mindedness, vanity, and superstition (*Reports of Regional Committees...*, 1967, p. 28–29). Atheistic worldview was actively popularized by

employees of regional and national TV. Following the instructions of the leadership, all television studios presented a documentary film entitled *Why I stopped believing in God* (Vovk, 2007, p. 166). Atheistic feature films were often shown, including: *It confuses all* (1960, film director – D. Musatova), *People with black souls* (1961, film director – P. Shamshur), *The End of the World* (1962, film director – B. Bunyeyev), *Confession* (1962, film director – V. Voronin), *Armageddon* (1962, film director – M. Izrailiev), *Sinner* (1962, film directors – F. Filippov, G. Yegiazarov), *All remains to people* (1963, film director – G. Nathanson), and others (Marynchenko, 2013, p. 142). According to the Institute for the Study of the USSR, 70 films of anti-religious content were shown in the country in the early 1960s (Marynchenko, 2013, p. 143).

The number of books, brochures, montages, and art exhibitions of anti-religious nature distributed among Ukrainians by means of libraries was constantly growing. In addition, there were atheist corners in houses of culture and clubs, as well as in places of public entertainment. The repertoire of amateur groups consisted of poems and stories that revealed the reactionary essence of religion. The party leadership tried to bring up each Ukrainian as a builder of communism with a new communist morality. Much attention was paid to young people. Schools and all educational institutions were subject to comprehensive atheization. The ground for forming a materialist worldview was placed in primary school textbooks. The leisure of Ukrainian pupils was diversified by means of lectures and evenings devoted to scientific and atheistic issues, including films and slides (*Reports of Regional Committees...*, 1967, pp. 21–22). Teachers had to carry out anti-religious work not only during the class but also in off-hour time, including organizing atheistic excursions, speaking to religious parents, and holding conversations of anti-religious character. A special “basic atheism” course for students was introduced. For example, the Vinnytsia Pedagogical Institute opened a new civil specialty – atheist lecturer (March, 1959; Vovk, 2007, p. 168). These facts confirm the existence of a whole system of actions aimed at destroying the religious outlook of the young Ukrainian generation and removing the church from the education system.

If atheistic propaganda did not work, the current party leadership started applying repressions. People were fired from their jobs because of their religious beliefs, they were threatened with administrative sanctions, called criminals and often deprived of parental rights (Baran, et al., 1999, pp. 113–114). For example, the report on assistance to local Soviet authorities in the Ivano-Frankivsk region appealed to strengthen control over the implementation of the legislation on cults (March, 1965). The same report stated that 31 parents in the Ivano-Frankivsk region had been deprived of parental rights, because their children did not vis-

it school for religious reasons (*Reports of Regional Committees...*, 1965, p. 6). As a result, these pupils were sent to boarding schools.

The religious discrimination of Ukrainians caused many complaints and applications to the central party and government institutions. Most applications were signed by dozens, hundreds or even thousands of indignant believers (*The Register of Believers Complaints...*, 1965). In the late 1970s 639 families of the Pentecostals in the Ukrainian SSR appealed to the higher authorities with petitions about the permission to move to any non-socialist country (Andrukhiv, 2006, p. 30). The reason for their decision was a rough violation of Art. 52 of the Constitution of the USSR "On freedom of conscience and religion".

Conclusions

Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn. During the 1960s and 1970s Ukrainians suffered many religious repressions and modernization of different church-religious life aspects. The Soviet government conducted a deliberate policy of eliminating the church life of the Ukrainian people, ignored centuries-old Ukrainian historical traditions, and tried to destroy the Ukrainian clergy. It resulted in mass closure of churches, monasteries, places of worship, centers of spiritual education. The new atheistic, anti-religious ideology was intensively propagated. This ideology interpreted the church as a "remnant" of the pre-Soviet era. Ukrainian religious beliefs considered to be a criminal offense in the totalitarian state.

However, the Soviet leadership could only weaken the Ukrainian religious life, but not completely destroy it. Opponents of the communist ideology and the administrative system as well as representatives of Ukraine's title nation wrote numerous petitions and complaints to the highest state court and organized non-stop vigils near monasteries and temples. Forced atheization of Ukrainians did not produce the expected results. Family traditions of religious education were much stronger for Ukrainian people than communist ideology and scientific atheism. The representatives of Ukraine's title nation kept believing. Closing religious communities determined their secret functioning. Ukrainians secretly visited churches and priests continued their illegal pastoral activities. Religious Ukrainian opposition during the 1960s and the 1970s contributed to the emergence of religious nonconformity and the next stage of the struggle for democratization and independence of the Ukrainian people.

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Social Politics of Civil Society

Polityka społeczna społeczeństwa obywatelskiego

• Abstrakt •

Artykuł prezentuje spojrzenie z punktu widzenia wielu kultur na cechy dynamiki zmian w rozumieniu pojęć takich jak „społeczeństwo”, „polityka” i „stan”. Niniejsza praca podejmuje temat złożoności i wielopłaszczyznowości indywidualnej świadomości politycznej. Autorzy rozwijają ten wątek w oparciu o dynamikę historyczną i proponują by rozważać proces transformacji antycznego państwa-miasta i wynikających z niej relacji politycznych w kontekście współczesnego państwa wraz z jego złożonym systemem politycznym. W artykule podkreślono, że trudność w rozumieniu charakteru i roli polityki społecznej wynika również z języka oraz różnic etymologicznych i koncepcyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka społeczna, społeczność, społeczeństwo, stan, obywatele, samoorganizacja

• Abstract •

This paper presents a cross-cultural overview of the features of the dynamics of the perception of the concepts of “society”, “politics”, and “state”. The work raises the issue of complex and multifaceted individual consciousness of understanding policy. Authors formulate this aspect from the perspective of historical dynamics and propose to explore the process of transformation of the ancient city-state and flowing therefrom political relations in the modern state with its complex political system. It was stressed that the problem of understanding the nature and role of social policy is complicated by language as well as etymological and conceptual differences.

Keywords: social policy, community, society, state, citizens, self-organization

The basic concept in the preparation of this work was to unite the efforts of different scientific disciplines representatives to solve one of the three fundamental areas of scientific knowledge problems, which can be drawn up on presence in the subject and object of study relationships between individuals in communities of

all sizes – from the family to global socium. In other words, everything that is accepted to interpret in the academic rhetoric as social sciences. Given the various methodological difficulties, which are inherent to the unification of knowledge on this principle (Сироткин, 2011, p. 74), and also constantly arising cross-cultural collisions in interpretation of various academic categories that are the result of interstate isolation of scientific knowledge systems formation processes to preserve the interest of a wide range of experts it was suggested to use at least capacious phrase – social policy. The reality of processes united by the term “globalization” in the world is increasingly becoming part of people’s consciousness, being expressed in the sense of belonging to the largest human community – the world socium, evolving from tribal ideas of the social world through the ethnic group, the ancient city and to the modern understanding of citizenship, outlined by the boundaries of each country. Communities of all sizes are converted into full participants of the global resources sharing. The modern society is becoming the society gradually embracing the whole inhabited world into one giant social system (Луман, 2000, p. 16). Understanding the scale of a problem allows the researcher to abstract from detection of social processes regularities in the subsystems only that in future should create the ground for general formal description of the world-system (Luhmann, 1980). If to omit the idea of Dante Alighieri on the establishment of a worldwide empire of humanity (Алигьери, 1999), inherently the concept of universal legal civil society – state (*civitas gentium*), proposed by Immanuel Kant in 1795, became the first research dedicated to solving the problem of scale in social sciences. “Only in such a society the highest goal of Nature can be achieved: the development of all its potentialities inherent in humanity; at the same time nature wants this purpose, like all the other implemented by itself” (Кант, 1966, p. 12). “The desire for self-preservation – this is the main motive, which is subject to each individually and altogether ... In accordance with the mind in the relationship of states between themselves there can be no other way to come out free from the law of state of constant war, other than repudiate, similar to individuals, from its wild (not based on law) freedom, to adapt to public compulsory law and thus form (obviously constantly extending) the people’s state, which finally will cover all the nations of the earth” (Höffe, 2011). Hence it follows that the process, ensuring coordination of a variety of internal interactions in each of its own unique subsystems, is nothing else than an aspiration to self preservation of the society through the maintenance of the order in the system. The implementation of regulatory interests of each individual in the social system takes place by means of a specific mechanism, concentrating the interests of society in relation to the life of individuals, constituting this society, what in essence is social policy.

The etymology and the concept of “society” have their roots in Latin in the noun “socius” – ally, fellow traveler, which is used in the description of positive interaction between individuals. In the process of life complication, slowly filling with diverse semantic contexts, allies gradually create a complex pattern of civilized (civil) society – “societas civilis”, fastened by threads of interests stretching from Roman collegiums’ microcosm “collegii societatis”.

The definition of “sociality” as a concept, identical to society in the natural conditions of human life, was quite clearly formulated by John Locke in *Two treatises of government* (1690)¹. Socium and society are identical also in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau *Du Contrat social; ou, Principes du droit politique* (*Of the social contract or principles of political right*, 1762). Over time, the notation of society as a “social” becomes regular, acquiring routine nature, overgrowing with different definitions and derivative interpretations in the process of use. Thus, for example, in 1834 Pierre Leroux in his article *De l’individualisme et du socialisme*, published in *Revue Encyclopédique*, first uses the term “socialism”, describing it as the opposite to the concept of liberal doctrine of individualism and free competition². In Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian the language emergence of “social” can be traced in the 19th century by borrowing from Western Europe and from the outset it is used in parallel with an understanding of the society (the world) as the integrity. Until recently, the post-Soviet understanding of “social” was quite vague and largely associated with socialism as a way to build social relations opposed to capitalism.

Still more complex and multifaceted for the individual consciousness is the understanding of politics. The problem of meaning filling, determination of everything we commonly call the “political” always existed and remained relevant to all peoples and nationalities. It is generally accepted that East Slavic languages have borrowed this concept from French where “polytique” through Latin mediation dates back to the Greek “polytike”, produced by “polis” – town, state. The earliest scientific works devoted to politics we find in ancient antiquity. In *Politics* (Πολιτικά) by Aristotle, the concept we are interested in is traditionally treated as “that is about polis” or in a broader sense as a “philosophy of human affairs”, where the sense of bringing people together is explained by the desire to achieve the high-

1 The original name of work – *Two Treatises of Government: In the Former, The False Principles, and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is an Essay concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government*.

2 “Encyclopédie nouvelle ou Dictionnaire philosophique, scientifique littéraire et industriel, offrant le tableau des connaissances humaines au dix-neuvième siècle par une société de savants et de littérateurs” (1834–1841).

est good. In *Republic* (Πολιτεία) the description of 158 ethnic groups' social order (prior to our time only the Athenian remained) is offered, considering the latter as the community, outside the polis and is not able to make it. The work Πολιτεία, written by Aristotle, who was mentored by Plato, is not interpreted as clearly. It is known that for the first time this work appeared in Europe through Arab sources, in which it has already been arranged under the title *Repubblica* – *Republic*. Obviously, for this same reason, the Russian-speaking reader got the work under the name *State*. It is believed that from the French (a known written source dates back to the year 1430) the concept of “political” migrated into English, where the source dates back to 1520 (Liberman, 2009). In modern English language the three main semantic units formed from the ancient “polis” are “politics”, “polity”, and “policy”.

“Politics” – is used about or with regard to citizenship and is the process by means of which groups of people take collective decisions. The word is commonly used in relation to the art of public affairs in the government, Parliament, local self-government extending also to special interest groups – religious, academic, and corporate layers of society. As a concept it covers all social relations connected by the power by means of the state.

“Polity” – society with control attributes inherent to statehood, government, public, and political territorial unit organized in a certain way.

“Policy” – the process of making and planning alternative solutions, rules, and methods of interaction usually in organizations in order to achieve rational results in the foreseeable future. It may also be seen as a statement of intent.

In the East Slavic group of languages such differentiation of the aforementioned concept does not exist, its application in the process of linguistic activity is made dependent on the context of the semantic load in each particular situation. But the prefix “poli-” is widely used in word formation, which indicates a plurality or a large amount of something or extreme manifestation of any attribute. Within our research it is particularly interesting to follow the concept “police, polizei, policia” transformation metamorphosis in Western variant as the embodiment of state-society, designed to reduce the differences in civil cases and the concept of “police” in the East Slavic language group as a system of government services and bodies established for the protection of the public order. However, without a preliminary study of the social processes that led to the modern understanding of the “statehood”, any conclusions concerning the problems outlined above will be fragmented. If we formulate the question from the perspective of historical trends, it turns out that we need to explore the process of turning an ancient city-state and political relations occurring in it into a modern state with its complex political sys-

tem. Such an approach maybe will also ease clarifying the difficulties arising from the interpretation of the previously mentioned work of Plato called *State*.

In the English and most European languages, Russian word “state” corresponds to “state” (*stato* – in Italian, *estado* – in Spanish, *état* – in French, *Staat* – in German). Ultimately, these linguistic units are derivatives from the Latin word “status”, which means “state” or “status” (Lieberman, 2009). In Ukrainian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Serbian, Slovenian, and Croatian various definitions are used as derivatives from the word “power”. In Polish language the word “państwo” corresponds to Russian “state” that according to the sounding is identical to the lexical unit “panstvo” and corresponds to the semantic load, indicating the number of persons possessing a certain status.

Hannah Arendt believes that the word “state” in European languages as a separate notion took shape only at the turn of 16th century to describe a new form of political organization that grew out of the Renaissance. Its view is based on the fact that in antique Greek and Roman law there was no specific legal fiction – a legal person, without which it is impossible to build a modern understanding of the concept of state. Therefore, along with the other documents known to us, the quote “Qui est rei publicae status?”, taken from the work of Cicero *De re publica* should be interpreted as follows, – “What is the position in the society?”. Hence “status rei publicae” – is a collection of individual statuses of independent equal citizens, interacting in a certain order, i.e. a form of government, then the combination of words “res publica” – will mean “public affair”. At the same time, decent individuals “civis” – citizens under the auspices of the agreement, which have the force of law for the whole society (“concilium coetusque hominum jure sociati”) act as a special social body – civitas, which is the prototype of the state (Arendt, 1958). Neither the Holy Roman Empire nor the Byzantine Empire nor other European kingdoms, consisting of innumerable set of virtually independent cities, estates, and corporations, were yet states in their essence; however, at the same time, they already had an overarching worldview underpinning. According to Niklas Luhmann, in order to justify the domination, social stratification, and personality that generalized regulatory submissions consolidated into space-religious morality emerge. Once oppositional, born by poor and oppressed periphery, inherently people’s understanding of the world becomes favorable for the society as a whole. Cultural and political relationships acquire a universal nature, due to the sacred understanding of reality, including the origin and status of the Holy See. In this world, designated as “res publica christiana” the Pope was the representative of the supreme authority harmoniously arranged by the higher mind, who gave the people the sacred law of justice, by which without any doubt the

whole of society must be guided. This peculiar monopoly on the universal knowledge is a crucial difference between the second Roman Empire and the first and especially the ancient world. Apart from all the other social interests, including business, the public discourse from “*res politicae*” shifts to a sacred sphere – “*res ecclesiasticae*” (Луман, 2000, p. 17). Here also together with the reasons for the association and co-operation all kinds of conflicts are also shifted. For example, in his speech at the Council of Lyons, created in 1245 with the aim of overthrowing Emperor Frederick II, Pope Innocent IV solving the question of whether it is possible to excommunicate a corporation stated that any ban applies only to the soul and conscience. Therefore, this action can not be performed on abstract concepts (*nomen intellectuale*) and legal denominations (*nomina sunt juris*), that have neither soul nor conscience nor will nor consciousness (Wetterau, 1994). The existence of a peculiar spiritual monopoly in the natural order has closed a significant part of the material flows in society on the church hierarchy, which in turn contributed to its rapid growth. The situation caused gradually increasing discussions about the ineligibility of wealth accumulation by church institutions as unworthy business for the spiritual realm and being the prerogative of the society and the secular authorities. It is noteworthy that the problem of coexistence of secular and ecclesiastical authorities in the context of primary origin, respectively, of subordination, as well as in the context of the origin of the rights of individuals to liberty and public control of the latter is considered in detail by many philosophers and theologians of that distant time. The conflict that broke out in 1075 between Pope Gregory VIII and Emperor Henry IV is very often described (Алигъери, 1999; Daguet, 2007). Thus, within the sacred sphere in opposition to the Catholic Church act both contenders for the regional authorities and the various theological currents of dissidents, which conditionally may be integrated under the concept of Protestantism. The ideal of new spiritual organizations is a return to apostolic Christianity. Inherently Reformation is reflected in the replacement of hierarchical subordination by the network coordination – parishioners regain the homolographic status and the ability to choose spiritual leaders. At the same time the first Protestants we know – John Wycliffe and John Huss translated biblical texts in the then popular English and Czech languages. A considerable role in the destruction of the spiritual monopoly belongs to a number of inventions in the printing business, which entailed the spreading of literacy. Reading books and sermons on the national source of supreme authority in the church in language clear to everyone stimulated a motley audience to participate in new organizations. Attempts to save the spiritual monopolies lead to a large-scale armed conflict that resulted in mass starvation and epidemics that affected the interests of all classes’ representa-

tives. Within each community gradually emerge legitimate regional variations of Christianity, coinciding with the linguistic and cultural areas, that allows talking about the final design of such a category as the “nation”, out of which national states slowly grow. The decay of “*res publica christiana*” distributed in time is accompanied by radical change in the understanding of everything that is relevant to the arrangement of political life. Once unifying mission degenerated into barren unification. Niccolo Machiavelli described the situation as follows: “It is not possible to provide more evidence of the religion decay, rather than an indication that the people, who is the closest to the Roman Church, being the head of our religion, is of least religious. The one who will consider the foundations of our religion and will see how different are its current customs from age-old, the original, will come to the conclusion that it is certainly close to either his death or to a painful tests. Rooted in Italy and appropriating secular power, the Roman Church has not proved to be neither as strong nor as glorious to be able to set their own tyranny over the whole of Italy and become its sovereign” (Макиавелли, 2009).

Faced with the prospect of increasing its competitive status, the elite are making intellectual efforts to develop new concepts, allowing to fasten their existence to the new reality. During the negotiations between the warring parties³ emerged the principle “*cuius regio, eius religio*” (the faith is of the one, to whom belongs the power), that is not only the actual approval of regional variants of Christianity, but also a perpetual transfer of the still sacred power to individuals, who previously received it only by means of the Holy See. The new Protestant concept acts as a kind of strengthening compound for the new independent monarchies. It is based on modernization of two ideas: God rules equally the spiritual (*regnum Christi*) and the worldly (*regnum civile*). People performing their worldly or professional duties, carry out a God-given vocation. All legal professions are pleasing to God. Consensus against those who disagree with the new version of the Regional Christianity was achieved. They are allowed to freely leave the territory of the kingdom, which essentially can be considered as nucleation of freedom of conscience. On the other hand, the idea allowing concentrating in one center the credentials that belong to many individuals, cities, and corporations is still needed. As a result, the findings transform into two very ordinary for us concepts: sovereignty and national or state interest.

The etymology of the word “sovereignty” dates back to the Latin “*superanus*”, or “*suprema potestas*”, which means “the highest authority” and to the French “*soveranite*” and owes its origin to the ancient concept of *basileus*. Aristotle in his

3 Peace of Augsburg 1555.

Politics gave the definition to *basileus* as ruler, elected by the people or accepted by the people voluntarily, in contrast to the ruler – a tyrant who seized power by force. Aristotle believed that the position of *basileus* has very ancient origins, and it was inherited by the Athenians in the mythological times. As a separate notion that characterized the limits of the supreme authority of the king, the term “sovereign” (sovereign) in 1282 was used by Philippe de Beaumanoir. This medieval lawyer created a collection of traditions (*coutume*), which have developed by this time in the north-eastern part of France – in the province of Bovezi and combined correspondingly entitled *Coutumes de Beauvaisis* (*Coustumes de Beauvoisis*). The collection contains the rules governing a wide variety of public relations. Its appearance is due to the fact that measures taken by Louis IX were aimed at centralizing power and thus demanded unification of the law in the northern territory under his control, where in contrast to the southern regions of France, exposed to significant influence of the Roman Empire, written law was not widely developed. De Beaumanoir devotes a separate article to the problem of sovereignty, which explains that besides the highest sovereign – king, other individuals within its territory may act as sovereign – barons, counts, and dukes (Бовези, 1961). There is also a more moderate point of view. According to it, the concept of sovereignty was first justified only in 1576 by the French jurist Jean Bodin in the treatise *Les six livres de la Republique*. The work is known by Russian-speaking readers under the title *Six Books of the Commonwealth*. It is from this work that classical definition of sovereignty as absolute and unshakable power of the monarch in a society is being widely cited (Сергунин, 2010, p. 5).

The concept of national and public interest comes from the Latin noun phrase “ratio status” – “the ratio of states”. Its literal translation and interpretation in a modern interpretation has numerous variations. The concept’s popularity was so great that it brought to life the birth of the “national” analogues. The French version it is “raison d’État”, in German – “Staatsräson”, in Italian – “ragione di stato”. In English version it is “national interest”, that is fully consistent with the modern concept of “national interest”. A pretty impressive number of reputable scientists’ works is dedicated to the above-mentioned concept. Of these the book of Giovanni Botero *Della ragion di Stato*, which was published in Italian in 1589, is the most famous. Usually its name is translated as “State wisdom” or “State mind”. As a result of such an interpretation, there is an opportunity use a specific, relevant to today’s realities context that is best illustrated by the words of Michel Foucault. “The state is governed by its inherent rational laws, which can not derive only from natural and divine laws, as also only from precepts of wisdom and prudence; state, like nature, has its own rationality, even if it is a special type of rationality”

(Фуко, 2011). However, this idea of “ragione di stato” as of the complex concept corresponds to the realities that distant time in a bad way – by the author’s worldview, in the part that concerns “state”, and it is close enough to the perception of reasonableness expressed through “rationality”.

It must be said about the existence of another very important feature – different ways of emergence of lexical units (and, of course, everything that is called the historical features of development) related to the state in the “Western” and “East Slavic” world still play a role in daily practice, expressed in relation of the society to its “formal structure”. In Russian culture “state” and the political power, which manages the common affairs of organized society are often confused (for example: “in this state...” and “state insists on the more intense intervention into economics...”; Власов, 2002, p. 70). According to our assumption, intuitive ideas about the state, for example of the French-speaking population are not equal to the ideas of the Russian-speaking population. The emergence in Russian language the word “state” can be traced from the time of Moscow principality expansion under the leadership of Grand Duke Ivan III (1462–1505). While expressing its power claims to “Lord Novgorod the Great and his voluntary people” the Grand Duke said: “We, the Grand Duke, want our state, both in Moscow, and in our Motherland Novgorod the Great. There will be no chamber in our homeland Novgorod, no head of the city, but we will rule the state” (Скрынников, 1994). But, in this context the word “state” is used as derivative from the word “sovereign”. On the one hand having sacred meaning that is transmitted by the expression “Lord God”, on the other hand corresponding to pragmatic view of the role “head” in human anatomy conditionally transferred to the structure of society (Barnes, 1982). The following situation may serve as an example. Diarchy, which arose in the course of “collecting land”, forced the “bailiff” from Novgorod “to look for the court” not in native “state”, but of the sole Chief Judge – “sovereign” Ivan III. “Complainants” seeking for “grace” bypassing the existing right used the title “sovereign” instead of “Lord”, indicating the advantage of Moscow’s ruler before Novgorod “state”, indirectly evidencing the emergence of a new relationship of subordination. It is known that shortly after the fall “Lord Novgorod the Great” Ivan III has expanded his title and became known as the Grand Duke of Moscow (Скрынников, 1994). Thus in Russian-language the concept of “statehood” encompasses the sacred meaning and dates back from the idea of centralization of power, as a common good for the country and its citizens.

Going back to “state of rationality” of Michel Foucault it is necessary to recall that “rationality” is interesting for us because of two coincidences: the similarity of views on it both in the past and in the present, and the existence of a high-

level identity, both in western and eastern language environment. The concept of rationality is an important part of modern scientific thinking and is widely used in philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, psychology, and pedagogy. The understanding of rationality as an essential quality of a modern man amenable to improvement in the socialization process is a kind of axiom of social sciences. The sense of rationality is also inherent in every single person, expressing confidence in their ability to regulate the reality and organize the future. Let's illustrate the above-said with the expression of Bertrand Russell: "I used to think of myself as of a Rationalist; both Rationalist and I think that this – is the one who desires people to be reasonable" (1928). In the complicating modern world it is becoming more difficult for a man to make rational decisions. Many people prefer to use heuristic analysis rather than the strict application of optimization rules due to the complexity of the situation and the impossibility to calculate and to take into account the utility of each possible action. The search for the best decision is also limited by the availability of resources, knowledge, and information (Herbert, 1957).

The concept of rationality is rooted in antiquity. The basis for transition "from myth to logos", from "magic of spirit to magic of numbers" were achievements in the field of mathematics – provisions of Hipparchus planimetry, the postulates of Euclidean geometry, the theory of magnitudes' correlation of Eudoxus of Cnidus, and mathematical school of Pythagoras. The number is at the core of things, taught Pythagoras, to know the world – means to know the numbers governing it. Space is an ordered expression of a number of initial essences. Numbers are not the atoms of the universe, which make up all the things. Things are not equal to numbers, but similar to them, based on quantitative relationships of the reality. The ratio of bodies is proportional, extended world of celestial bodies obeys the laws of geometry and mathematics, the human body is beautiful and arranged according to the Polykleitos canon. The magic beauty of the "golden ration" or "golden section" law further agitated the minds of mankind throughout its history, from Leonardo da Vinci and Newton to our contemporaries, embodied in the most diverse spheres of human activity (Гриценко и др., 2008). In Latin in the word "ratio" – "calculation", "relation", "reason", sometimes "mind", from which actually "rationalitas" is derived – rationality as a lexical unit, the mathematical context is present immanently. It is precisely this sense that Romans laid down in the title of the treasurer of the empire – "Rationalis", which was later abolished by the emperor Diocletian, notorious as the "author" of the most ancient financial crisis (Barnes, 1982). Thomas Hobbes describes the existence of the above-mentioned relationship as follows: "The Romans called cash accounts rationes, and

the counting operation – ratiocinatio, also those things that we in debentures and counting books call the article accounts they called nomina, i.e. titles, and hence, it seems that, they spread the word ratio on the ability of an account in all other things. The Greeks have only one word logos for speech and mind” (Γοβ6c, 1991).

Aristotle believed that the possession of rationality is the hallmark of men: man (the masculine creature) – is a “rational animal ζῷον λογικόν”. To all the living beings natural cognitive abilities are inherent: language, sight, smell, and in exceptional cases, rationality. Due to the fact that nature has endowed man with rationality, he can be a “political animal πολιτικὸν ζῷον” (Mulgan, 1974). Rationality, along with other natural abilities such as strength, agility, courage, in the natural order “appoints” a man the responsible position of family head. Thus, man becomes a necessary and natural condition around which the basic unit of society is formed – “οἶκος house, household, house and grounds”. Its design due to its naturalness is unbreakable. For the same reason, the state of a woman who by virtue of ability to stand in need of protection and care always remains unchanged. The meaning of household in the representation of the ancient Greeks is fundamental. A separate science is dedicated to it – “οἰκονομικός economy”, which, along with other disciplines, before becoming “equal among the equal”, every man is obliged to learn. The existence of polis is as natural as the existence of a household and is caused by the desire of people to live together. The innate inequality of abilities is the reason why people unite, hence it is also the difference between functions and the position of people in the society. In the very essence of things the order is rooted, by virtue of which from the moment of birth, some creatures are meant to obey, while others – to rule. The nature of every object is that its “κατάστασις condition”, which is obtained at the completion of its development. One slave is different to the other slave; one master is different to the other master. How much craft work stands out above the slave labor? Craftsman, who is doing the low craft, is in a state of a limited slavery; the slave is the slave by nature, but neither the shoemaker, nor any other craftsmen are ones by nature. The philosopher draws a static picture of the human society, in which individuals are at different stages of the “social ladder”, that is, they are in a certain position with respect to each other and all together simultaneously. The idea of society structure as a “condition” of citizens is displayed by ancient jurists in “Corpus juris civilis” and by means of Roman law reception it is preserved up to the present day.

The static model of society is used in the works of many researchers. Thomas Hobbes thought that the natural state (*status naturalis*) of individuals in the society preceded the civil status (*status civilis*). Under the natural state, man uses his own power at his discretion to maintain his own nature, that is, own life. In the

civil status people agree to abandon the right to all things to the extent which is necessary in the interests of peace and self-defense and are satisfied with a degree of freedom with regard to other people, which they would allow to the other people in relation to themselves. In the absence of civil status it is always a war of all against all. According to Immanuel Kant, the condition of individuals as a part of people in relation to each other is called civil (*status civilis*), and their set in regard to its own members – state (*civitas*). By virtue of its shape as something related to the general interest of all to be in a legal state, it is called commonwealth or commonality (*res publica*; Кант, 1966). Thomas Hobbes defines the state as a single entity, responsible for the actions of which the great number of people made themselves responsible for, to enable this entity to use the power and the means of those in any way needed for a peaceful state and general protection (Гоббс, 1991). “State substance is a combination of the principle of family and civil status” – postulates in the *Philosophy of Spirit* Georg Hegel (Герель, 2008). There is quite an old and a fairly widespread belief that the first known to us source in which the word “State” (Italian equivalent “stato”) corresponds to the modern English word “state” were the works of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527; Dowdall, 1923, p. 98). However, modern scholars believe that as concept the word “stato” was synonymous with neither the Greek “polis” nor Roman “Republic”, mainly because there was no ethical component in it. In other words, the word “stato”, which for lack of a better word we translate as “state” or “public”, due to a stronger link with a political body, suggests something similar to “power apparatus”. The notion was filled with content following the development of the described object itself – national state, and still it did not materialize in most European monarchies, although the term has already begun to live its own life (Алексеева, 2011). It is known that the basis for the development of a new civilization, the common heritage of culture of all the peoples of the West were three major achievements of the Roman civilization – the Latin language, Roman public institutions, and the Roman law. In our opinion, static model of the society – understanding the structure of society as a “condition” of citizens that almost completely corresponds to the modern legal term “civil condition” with the only difference that it applies in relation to each individual equal citizen, was developing in line with jurisprudence as the reception of the Roman law provisions. The organization of a centralized system of authority relations required justice structure complexity, which, in turn, caused the necessity of legislation unification, based on the disparate positions of traditional city law. Hierarchical subordination structure of judicial institutions pushed the final decision-making authorities territorially outside the settlements. The existing identification of persons by “interpersonal recognition” in many cases caused seri-

ous problems for making competent judgments. The problems created by the absence of written documents proving the civil status of all the participants of the trial, along with the widespread use of “nicknames” in public circulation demanded an immediate solution. In 1589 the king of France, Francis I issued one of the first official documents in which four articles were devoted to the settlement of legal status of citizens. According to the sacred concept of Bishop Lansky Alberoni on the Christian structure of society, “christiana status”, from now on in the kingdom three states are fixed: clergy – takes care of the spiritual health of the congregation, chivalry guards it, and the rest of the remaining population is engaged in worldly affairs. Everyone stays in their place in the hierarchy of the earth where God placed them, and this hierarchy reflects the heavenly hierarchy: *Distinctus disponitur ordo supernus, Cuius ad exemplar terrenus fertur haberi* (The basis of the heavenly order – is inequality, and earthly, as it is said, is created in the image of the heavenly). Ordinance Villers-Cotterets (Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts) has obliged all the subjects to use French instead of Latin in the official documents (Флори, 1999). The static model of the Christian world – state of peace, “status mundi – is one of the main themes of the sacred discourse. For example, according to the teachings of Joachim of Flora, or Calabria (1130–1202) set out in his work *Matching Old and New Testaments*, history of mankind is a manifestation of the divine revelation. To every face of the Holy Trinity relates its own special stage of revelation, which corresponds to a certain state of the world. “The first state of the world was held in slave service <<servitus status>>, second – in filial obedience <<servitus filialis status>>, and third state <<tertius status in plena spiritus libertate>> – is the future, which is in the acquisition of human freedom of the spirit and liberation from worldly cares. The first is the state of slaves, second – sons, third – friends”. The concept of Joachim of Floris was in sharp contrast with the official church doctrine. The greatest authority of the time Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) rejected it, and it has been consistently condemned by three church councils (Семенов, 2003). However, according to Jean d’Alembert, the emergence of society differentiation into three states has been caused by previous historical events. The author believed that the feudal social relations are in many ways a paradoxical result of transfer to the local population of the traditions of “military democracy” of the Germanic tribes who invaded the Roman Empire. “During the conquest, these peoples have preserved customs, habits and inclinations of their homeland, because no nation is changing rapidly their way of thinking and acting. Armies withdrawing from their overpopulated areas were not the armies of mercenaries. These were the associations of volunteers and accomplices of the campaigns undertaken. All associations under the command of their leaders

were separate armies of any campaign, and everyone fell under the general leader – military leader, elected by common agreement among the leaders of the groups; in a word it was the allied army. The formation of this society required that ownership of conquered areas belonged to all members of the allies and each had its share due to the fact that he helped to win” (Ревуненкова, 1978). According to Lewis Morgan, in such professional military communities the traditions of “military democracy” are immanently caused by Potestarian relations, which are characterized by extreme ideology of valor and courage, based on competitiveness, multilevel ranking achievements through intuitively clear for all members of the military collective pragmatic assessment of the physical, moral, and intellectual qualities of the individual. The full members of the team were considered to be only adult and healthy men trained in weapons handling. Any man who did not have all this complex of skills needed to conduct a war was considered to be an “outcast” and did not have the right to vote. At various times, military democracy existed in almost all nations. Among the ancient Germans the election of leader was accompanied by numerous military ceremonies with a pronounced ideological character. Voting was carried out through concerted shouting and raising weapons in the right hand – acclamation and ended with raising the leader on a shield. Over time, the tradition was preserved – the procedure for electing the king of the Frankish kingdom and the German Empire was largely identical (Мопран, 1933). It is believed that over time the Franks have transformed such meetings into the so-called March fields, “champ de mai”, the Germans and Scandinavians into tings (scand. “ting”, icel. “þing”, ger. “Tag”), Anglo-Saxons into “witenagemot”. Further specialization of the “military line” – the emergence of aristocracy and legal institutions – is the basis for the second state. The rebirth of military democracy into the urban – a civil way of development, which is caused by the emergence of urban settlements and specialization at industrial and commercial fields, that in turn, served as the basis for the emergence of traditional law of the third generation. Exactly this “communal revolution” (between 10th and 13th century) contributed to finalizing the concept of the three states of the medieval society. At the end of the 12th century the rivalry for power between King Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII grew into a wider conflict. Its apogee was the ban on export from France of gold and silver coins. To make the king’s decision legitimate, apart from the constantly operating Royal Council (“Conseil du roi”), a principally new institution in which all three states were represented was convened on 10 April 1302. Its name clearly reflects the finalized static model of society – States-General, “États généraux”. The notion of the structure of society as a state of citizens was sufficiently robust and widespread across the Eu-

ropean territory, which is testified by eloquent official names of class meetings: Estates of Scotland or Thrie Estaitis – Scotland, 1326; Ståndsriksdagen – Sweden, 1435; Staten-Generaal – Netherlands (Duchy of Burgundy), 1464. Nikolai Lazarevsky believed that in the Russian Empire the concept of the three states was borrowed from the European legislation by Catherine II in 1785 and it is mostly reflected in the Charter to the Nobility and Charter on the rights and benefits of cities. In 1832 Russian lawyers, when systematizing uncoordinated legislation, have created the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire. Volume 9 of this edition is called – “Laws on the states”. However, many meanings of the word “state” caused more frequent use not only in everyday language but also in the scientific revolution the lexical unit “estates”. Nikolai Lazarevsky was proving that using the word “state” would be more correct and accurate: “The concept of estate according to the terminology of the current legislation is very uncertain. In our legislation, this concept is corresponded by the term state – a separate group of subjects that with their legal position are in a certain way different from the rest of the population, and these differences are inherited. Occasionally, however, in law the term estate in this sense is also used”. The static model of society is also reflected in works of many researchers from the Holy Roman Empire (Лазаревский, 1890). In 1488 Alsatian monk Johannes Lichtenberger, Frederick III’s court astrologer, published in Heidelberg his popular book *Prediction (Prognosticatio)*, having a pronounced encyclopedic nature. The work is entirely devoted to predicting political events and contains a large number of mathematical and geometrical calculations, detailed excursions into history, substantial alchemical information, moral guidance for the nobility, and an extensive apology for astrology. Soon the work was translated from Latin into German and by 1600 it was reprinted 60 times by large print runs. The publication contained a large number of attractive engravings-illustrations, which also contributed to its immense popularity. The notion of the society structure as of a state (Stand) of three states citizen is reflected on a separate engraving and reasoned in details on multiple pages: according to the teachings of Christ, first state pronounces sacred prayer, the second is designed to protect, and third for everyday work (Mentgen, 2005, p. 227). In 1495 between Emperor Maximilian I, the Holy See, and the urban classes of the empire agreement on establishment of Reichstag as the highest representative body of the imperial states (classes) was reached. The Reichstag consisted of three chambers – in the first two the representatives of aristocracy and clergy were sitting, in the third which got the title “Reichsstädtekollegium or Reichsstädterat” – the representatives of cities. Legislative activity of the Reichstag was expressed in publishing of the set of disparate regulations, which became known as the imperial police regulations “Re-

ichspolizeiordnungen". These documents mainly regulated the activities of the third imperial estate "Reichsständen", unfolding in free "Freie Stadt" and imperial cities "Reichsstadt" and regions falling under their influence, which territorially coincide with the principalities. It is fully consistent with the current understanding of the state, an association (union) of which was the Holy Roman Empire. We can say that such idea of Germany's federal political structure since that distant time has remained to the present day.

Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff among the German authors was one of the first to equate the internal social structure of principalities both as the state of the empire citizens and as a state (Union) of principalities in his book *Teutonic princely state* (*Teutscher Fürstenstaat*, 1655). In both this and the other his famous work – *Christian state* (*Der Christenstaat*, 1685), the already fully formed reformatory patron absolutist conception of power is well reflected. Secular power was established by God to punish the wicked and protect the pious. Nobody but the German princes can be trusted by God to take care about the subjects of their kingdoms, and that is why they are responsible to the divine authority for the existence of an equitable social order in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. This concern is similar to the father's care of his family. Patron must ensure not only the preservation of peace, well-being, and public order in the territory entrusted to him, but also he must take care of the health, moral, and cultural development of his subjects. Thus, the initiative of public goods' production – economic and cultural self-development of urban citizens (Polizeistädte) formerly owned by the public of the city, gradually submits to the central will, slowly unifying and standardizing.

The functioning of a fairly complex community-city mechanism protecting life, health, property, and public order through complex internal interactions between departments' guilds and parishes, realizing the desire of each individual citizen to well-being through his own participation, is characterized by the leader of Reformation Martin Luther as "guter Polizei". In his work *To the Christian Nobility of the German nation on the improvement of Christian state* (1520) Luther sets out the idea of a new fair order for independent German states. "There is no other power in Christianity rather than only for improvement. God gave us power not to worsen, but to improve Christianity. In Christianity there must be the following order: each city chooses from a godly community an enlightened citizen, instructs him to take the post of parish priest, and offers the maintenance from the community so that he by preaching and sacraments helps manage the parishioners and the community. The title of the parish priest is ascertained by God and is designed to manage communities by means of the sermon. By this abode the priest should live and have his own terrestrial farming. District courts and

traditional law should be preferred to imperial common-law. And may it be the will of the Lord to make every region governed by its own short right according to their way of life and occupations as it was before. Extensive detailed laws serve only to encumber people and hamper rather than promote justice. Reasonable secular rulers give the community enough rights to manage the mundane affairs. Is there a rational man among us, who could judge his fellows?”. Besides the community affairs within Commandments a Christian should also contribute to the secular authority. Luther writes: “That’s why, if you see, one lacks the executioner, the judicial police officer, a judge, lord or Duke, and you think you are capable of doing it, you should require this position, not to make the required power (the government) despised, that it was not weak and did not die. Because the world can not manage without it. We are Christians, and each of us is obliged to help another. We have the power in front of God and the world, leave and allow it in the name of unity. Because Christ says: Where the two will unite on the Earth, I am among them there. If it is the will of God, we from both sides will facilitate this, from both sides the hands with fraternal humbleness will stretch out, and we will approve ourselves not in our power or right; love is more important and necessary than the Roman papacy, in which there is no love, as well as love is possible without the papacy”. Municipality of the German people – principal ideal propagated by Reformed Church – contributed not only to the transformation of Germany itself, but Europe as a whole. According to the views of Luther, the structure of communities in apostolic times should serve as a model for a political structure of the new German society. “For the glory of God, in the help to one’s neighbor” – here is the most full and multilateral religious and moral ideal of a future life in accordance with primary sources of Christianity. And today this expression taken from the public discourse of that distant time can be found in Germany, inscribed on the buildings of the voluntary fire brigade depot. According to Max Weber, Lutheran concept of the Protestant work ethic, which had determined labor zeal and rational organization of work of the most rapidly developing countries such as Holland, England, and the USA, has served as a turning point in the emergence of capitalist enterprises and determined the spirit of the new times (Be6ep, 1990, p. 44). But, apart from the traditions of entrepreneurship, Protestant sermon has also laid the foundations of a modern civil society through nurturing in the congregation the culture of government and collaboration. According to Wilhelm Dilthey, Reformation played a fundamental role in shaping the modern German state and European culture, having defined the community as bearer of political organization of social action. “Inner man”, the invisibility of the religious process in it, his freedom does not contain a relationship of power and obedience in the eccle-

siastical a whole: only political alliances enable the organization of social action. The sphere of faith affairs – is the secular society and its arrangement. With this state the total termination of any Church social action is achieved. This is one of the greatest organization ideas ever created by man. Instead of ranks of the three states established by birth, a Christian and secular society appears – an apostolic community of believers and secular traditions in the relations between members of a civil society. Prayers, protection, and labour are performed all together and by each separately only when each is occupied by his own business (Дильтей, 2000). A peculiar reception of Luther modernist project on transformation of society has become the German political science (Polizewissenschaft), laid by explorations of von Zeckendorf, initially oriented on common affair of improving national federal state similarly to “economic partnership on shares”, which is intended to take care of the increasing population and its well-being.

Of course, our cross-cultural overview of the development dynamics of the concepts of “socium”, “politics”, “state”, and “society” is a rather quick and conditional, but it allows to select between them a partial identity in relation to society as to some aggregate of individuals, united by the common goal of reaching a certain level of satisfying a wide range of needs. Simultaneously, an indication on an action or interaction, their sequence or specified order is present only in the definition of “politics”, that in turn, allows to interpret the combination of words “social politics” in an extended foreshortening. Although since the times of the “Iron Curtain” more than twenty years have passed in the former Soviet Union, the lack of information is still felt, which would allow to demythologize stamps and beliefs caused by the previously dominant monopoly of theoretical doctrines. Such inertial attitude is imposed on Western institutions’ export expansion, which in turn is accompanied by fragmentary reception of theoretical constructs complicated by linguistic, conceptual, and etymological differences. To resolve this dissonance further, critical analysis of conceptual and categorical framework is needed. We assume that this is why in the former Soviet Union areas most theorists and practitioners of “social politics” understand politics held by the government (“governmental social policy”) in the sphere of social insurance – centralized resource allocation from the funds, provided in the state budget for the purpose of leveling the social situation of individuals and groups as compared with the rest of society. Also a set of measures to ensure free (preferential) access to other material and nonmaterial resources, which are administered by the government, including all procedures associated with the production and management of public benefits refers to social policy. Besides government, as the subjects of social policy can serve also supranational entities (in this case we speak of a supranational social policy),

individual administrative units (local or regional social policy), as well as separate public and commercial organizations (internal social policy).

Hence, as the subjects of state social policy can act only the institutions or organizations that are involved or directly influence the development of the social policies of the government – first of all, these are legislative and executive authorities of all levels, as well as large business well represented in them, and to a lesser degree – trade unions and other civil society organizations. We believe that this view only partly reflects the entire spectrum of relations taking place in the society on a daily basis, artificially limiting the field for analysis and scientific expertise of cause-effect relationships in the area of social problems solution. Social policy can not be just a part of government activities in order to prevent social unrest, it is a complex system of various activities carried out by citizens who are both in hierarchical and also network coalitions aimed at identifying, matching, and satisfying the interests of individuals and social groups. First of all, the subjects of social policy are the individuals whose activities are aimed at achieving prosperity and stability for their families based on affective and emotional links. Formation of social policy is the result of interaction between social subsystems in a form of purposeful activities of individuals, living in a certain territory and being in diverse social connections among which the main are relations concerning resource management in production, distribution, exchange, and consumption caused by the need of maintaining physical life activity. Striving to achieve a certain level of wealth, and, later, preservation of a stable environment in the future is the main motive behind cooperation for the establishment of a social order. Matching variety of spiritual and material needs takes place in the framework of various specialized organizations. Individuals who are in different social structures, in relation to them can act as an object and also as a subject of management. Thus, the government is just a separate subject of social policy, to which the citizens in order to establish social order, delegated the part of their competences, partly to having limited their possible liabilities to perform a set of rules and payments in the form of tax. In turn, development and implementation of the government (state) social policy is always accompanied by the need to establish priorities in determining the most important social problems, requiring urgent solutions, directly pointing out that the centralized redistribution of resources can not be the only satisfactory option to establish social order. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that the use of a centralized way to redistribute the resources is largely caused by the imperfection of market exchange. The existence of such flaws, inherent in these two almost opposite sides of human activities organization, originally predefined by their natural qualities, allows you to emphasize a certain set of social demand, sat-

ified by the third alternative method. Intuitively it is clear that this third method is used in parallel with the first two, compensating their shortcomings. Its natural area of distribution is limited by functions carried out by the market or centralized redistribution. Thus, the viability of a third mode of public goods production depends only on the subjects, generating the demand for it, which should at the same time act both as performers and organizers, in other words – to organize by themselves. In this context, self organization should be understood as dynamic processes that, as a result of a cooperative interaction between the elements of one level, lead to streamlining the state owing to internal factors, by forming a more effective structure of higher level, which has new qualities. Organizations created by means of the method described above are usually attributed to the third sector of the modern civil society.

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Forms of Government and Typology of Political Regimes in Ukrainian Socialist-Oriented Political Theory of Western Ukraine in the Interwar Period of the 20th Century

**Ustroje polityczne i typologia reżimów politycznych
w teorii zachodnioukraińskiej szkoły socjalistycznej
w okresie międzywojennym**

• Abstrakt •

Przekonania teoretyków szkoły zachodnioukraińskiej, publikacje oraz deklaracje stanowisk partii o dążeniach socjalistycznych zostały zbierane dla celów analizy ustrojów i instytucjonalnych podstaw państwa. Zanalizowany został również wkład ukraińskich socjalistycznych myślicieli w zakresie problematyki związanej z klasyfikacją reżimów politycznych oraz zdefiniowaniem ich wyznaczników. W artykule przedstawiono wkład naukowy teoretyków ukraińskich socjalistycznych opinii politycznych w badanie form ustroju politycznego, zasady podziału władzy, mechanizmów gwarantujących zachowanie równowagi politycznej pomiędzy odmiennymi rodzajami władzy, instytucjami państwowo-politycznymi, parlamentem i rządem, problematykę praw i wolności osób, procesu wyborczego oraz przywódców lokalnych władz samorządowych. W artykule zaprezentowano priorytety polityczne naukowców i ideologów ukraińskiego zorganizowanego socjalizmu oraz ich teoretyczne konstrukcje procesu politycznego.

• Abstract •

Persuasion of theorists of Ukrainian political opinion of Western Ukraine, publications and position papers of socialistic aspiration parties for the purpose the analysis of forms and institutional bases of the state are investigated. The input of the Ukrainian thinkers-socialists in the range of problems of classification of the political regimes and determination of their signs are analysed. The scientific contribution of theorists of Ukrainian political opinion of socialistic aspiration out to research of forms state government, principle of distribution of power and system of inhibitions and counter-balances between its branches, state-political institutions of the country, parliament and government, problems of rights and freedoms of a person, electoral process, and local self-government leaders are found out. Political priorities of scientists and ideologists of Ukrainian organized socialism are investigated, their constructions of process are exposed.

Słowa kluczowe: państwo, socjalizm, poglądy polityczne, ustrój polityczny, podział władzy

Keywords: state, socialism, political opinion, political regime, distribution of power

Introduction

Research of domestic political thought and practices of political organization acquires an important value in our time not only in terms of actualization of political science inheritance of the Ukrainian thinkers, but, foremost, in terms of optimal use of ideological and theoretical works and practical experience of the past. In the time of development of state-political institutes in Ukraine, forms of state research issues have become especially important, in particular the scientific heritage of the Ukrainian political theoreticians' thoughts on the subject of the analysis of forms of government and typology of political regimes, whose value for modern political theory and practice of state-building is undoubted.

Methodology

Some aspects of the theoreticians' viewpoints of Ukrainian political thought of Western Ukraine socialist direction were investigated in Boris Kukhta's (Kukhta, 1993) and Tatiana Hodak's (Khodak, 2008) works. The programmatic documents of parties' socialist direction became the subject of a number of historical researches (Kuhutyak, 1993; Kul'chyts'kyy, 1999; Raykivs'kyy, 1995). However, political science component of the analysis of this problem, especially on the subject of the state remains largely unexplored.

The aim of this study is to clarify the issues and forms of government typology of political regimes and the process of Ukrainian state-building in Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine.

Results and Discussion

"The state is a juridically united people on some certain area with the constant independent authority" – the following definition of the state was proposed by Matviy Stakhiv (member of USRP), who is a theoretician of Ukrainian organized socialism, one of the brightest representatives of Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine. This formulation is similar to those definitions

which were suggested by modern political science, in particular to the provisions of the juridical theory of the state's origin, considering it as a juridical form of organization and functioning of political authority. According to Stakhiv, the state is disclosed because of its basic characteristics such as a territory, population, and authority; thus "people are the most important foundation of the state" (Stakhiv, 1935). The meaning of the state as a category of political science is derived by the ideologist of socialism from its importance not only as a mechanical system of government establishment, as well as a combination of the government and the people, but also a system of institutions through which the authority is realized with the aim of ensuring security, order, and development of state's territory and its population. It is worth to pay attention to the fact that in a relationship between the state and citizens the priority is recognized according to the latter (the state is for man, not man for the state). In our opinion, protection of human rights and freedoms, security, and welfare are declared as the main duty of the state, which indicates the liberal origins and modern nature of Ukrainian socialism.

Through the prism of political science Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine also considers state forms, distinguishing two classic forms of state's government such as monarchy and republic. The legitimacy of the monarch's power is determined by "his own right to reign" (the source of power is the monarch), while the republic power "must be come from the people and is always elected" (the people are the source of power; Stakhiv, 1935). In the sequence of historical development three types of monarchies are distinguished: an elective monarchy, an absolute monarchy, and a constitutional monarchy. It was a clear realization that the forms of government do not exhaust the understanding of forms of the state.

The state's criteria of another typology have become "the different nature of authority" (political regime is a demonstration of this typology in the modern political science; Stakhiv, 1935). Based on this criterion Matthew Stakhiv distinguished such forms of government organization as democracy, aristocracy, theocracy, and dictatorship of the plutocracy. Democracy is a political regime in which "power comes only from the people's will"; when it is the aristocracy regime the state's authority which "is created by only one noble class"; theocracy involves identification of a terrestrial power with a religious power, state's power implementation of state is done by the "sacred class"; if it is plutocracy the power is held by the "class of the richest"; dictatorship involves concentrating all power in the hands of one person or group of people and total control over society through state bureaucracy can be "recognized clearly as dictatorship" or can pretend to be a different regime (Stakhiv, 1935).

Essentially, regimes were classified as democratic and undemocratic. Moreover, dictatorship was seen as a kind of power, which is transitional either to democracy or to a harder (compared to dictatorship) regime of power (in modern political science it is a totalitarian regime). Based on the analysis of the communist and fascist ideologies and political regimes which were established in a number of countries in the interwar era (notably in Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR), common features of communist and fascist regimes were described by the theoreticians of Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine.

"These are common features for these two movements: 1) Dictatorship is similarly adored and every possibility to destroy the very idea of democracy is used; 2) They equally despise the masses and are keen that people dutifully obey the dictator and his entourage who create a new gentry; 3) Holding their power, fascism and communism are similarly cruel and bloody systems of a terror killing millions people who have their own thought; 4) Fascists and communists equally do not acknowledge individual liberty, freedom of thought and speech, freedom of organization and science; 5) Both regimes equally aspire to state capitalism which harnesses all people under the command of the dictator's entourage" (Stakhiv, 1936). "The only difference between them is that the communists instead of the word 'nation', which has to hide fascist dictatorship, use the word 'proletariat', which has to mask commissar dictatorship that ultimately is no different from the Nazi" (Stakhiv, 1936).

In fact, signs of totalitarianism were determined before the explosion of World War II, long before the studies of this phenomenon were acknowledged in modern political science. This fact certainly is evidence of the maturity of the Ukrainian political thought in the interwar period and the high level of scientific analysis of its theoreticians. The ideologists of Ukrainian socialist oriented political thought of Western Ukraine uniquely positioned themselves as adherents of democracy. They have identified the following principles and signs of this regime: 1) Nation is the only source of power and the bearer of sovereignty ("Nation itself, all its members together are the bearers of power and independence"); 2) Personal and civil rights and freedoms (including freedom of political organization) are inviolable, in relations "person – state" the former occupies a privileged position; 3) Equality of all before the law; 4) The only way of forming government is "free election"; 5) Separation of powers into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial; 6) High level of political culture and general education of citizens ("without education proper information of the masses about state affairs is impossible"); 7) Free development of the press, without which "democratic system is impossible" (Stakhiv, 1935).

It should be stated that most of the proclaimed principles are at the same time the legal states characteristics.

It was considered the problem of rights and freedoms in close connection with democracy as one of its basic characteristics. Personal rights and freedoms were allocated (privacy of citizens); civil rights and freedom: security of person, inviolability of the dwelling and property of citizens ("state authorities were not allowed to autocratically arrest citizens, were not allowed to do home or personal revisions, were not allowed to confiscate property"); special emphasis was placed on freedom of faith and belief: religious freedom, freedom of speech and printing; political freedom is considered no less important (considered as a condition and guarantee of compliance with all the other freedoms), to which the freedom of realization of mass actions and creating social and political organizations are attributed (Stakhiv, 1935).

The ideologists of Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine considered the differentiation of party as social consequence and it was viewed as a natural phenomenon of a democratic political process. Political parties had to reflect interests of different social groups, each wanting to influence the course of state policy. The necessity to observe social equality by socialists was especially emphasized when "the law does not make any difference regarding a person's position" (Stakhiv, 1935).

The distribution of power was one of the central problems of the state and its forms. Theoreticians of Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine proclaimed the "independence" of the three branches of government – legislative, executive, and judicial as a necessary condition for democratic development, when "their mutual validity should be well-organized so that between those authorities was balance, namely, that one had no advantage over the second and could not enslave citizens" (Stakhiv, 1935). It is seen clearly as the principle of balance of power, i.e., the system of checks and balances that political science defines as a mandatory element of the democratic political process.

At the same time, Volodymyr Starosolskyi, a representative of Ukrainian political socialist oriented thought of Western Ukraine, criticized Montesquieu's theory about the separation of powers, thinking that this division is not possible, not only in the sense of balance and independence of powers, but also in terms of their functions and competencies. Thus, claimed the thinker, the term "executive power" was created by the political theory and accepted by practice is "false and does not correspond to the true sense of the state activity of which it is determined by" (Starosol's'kyi, 1950). On the one hand, the term is too wide because it covers also judicial power, which also executes laws and therefore is partly endowed with

executive power; on the other hand, it is too narrow, because executive power also creates separate normative and legal acts, i.e. has practical elements of the legislature. Basically, Starosolskyi refused absolute statements about the division of powers into three branches, motivating it by the fact that none of the three powers are not only a carrier of power, it is believed that is exclusively accomplished by it. The thinker suggested using the term “administration” instead of “executive power”.

People are the source of legislative power. M. Stakhiv claimed that “in direct democracy legislative power itself is created by the whole nation. In a representative democracy the nation makes the decision by voting about who should make laws on behalf of it”. Thus, democracy has been divided into direct and representative. Executive power is called to execute the laws which were accepted by the parliament. Judicial power should operate on the basis of full independence and specialization. Matthew Stakhiv separately defines the public-political institution of the “head” (leader) of state and therefore “the home authority”, which in monarchies is the hereditary monarch, and in republics is the elected president. Moreover, the head of state does not belong to any of the branches of government.

Based on analysis of the credential's balance in the power triangle “president – government – parliament”, the system of government has been classified in a way similar to the division of republics into presidential, parliamentary and mixed that is proposed by the modern political science. “In some states, the president himself is the leader of the government and he is responsible for his policies ... In other only refers executive power, but is not responsible for its policy, because only ministers are responsible to the legislature... Finally, there is a mixed system where the president is irresponsible, but can execute some governmental acts himself” (Stakhiv, 1935).

B. Starosolskyi thoroughly analyzed competences in accordance with the principle of separation of powers. The thinker emphasizes the dependence of the competences on the form of government and form of state in general, as the division into the monarchy and the republic is not the only one possible. Thus, the powers of the supreme power (head of state) with a relatively large decrease in non-parliamentary states as the implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty state. The thinker's statement about greater compliance with the principles of parliamentary democracy form of government is therefore obvious.

In the context of the separation of powers, V. Starosolskyi assigned a specific role to the supreme power that is the institution of the president, depending on the form of government. “On a background of the division of authorities there was a necessity of establishment that is not overcome by a ‘division’ itself and it would retain connection between them and would give a guarantee that unity of the state

will not be broken by divergence of three different 'authorities'. This is the supreme power" (Starosol's'kyi, 1950). The method of electing the head of state – directly by the people or the legislature depends on the government's form. Popularly elected head of state certainly has more a significant political and legal status. The President has a special privileged position in the civil and criminal law, which in modern constitutional law is defined as inviolability at the time of his authority.

Ukrainian socialist oriented political thought of Western Ukraine believed that an indicator of democracy and civic self-organization is the level of development of local self-government were "own affairs are discussed by concerned citizens though their trusted people, not though the state officials". The following types of local government were enumerated: social (level of settlement), district, and county.

Based on the principles of popular sovereignty, the only way of forming a government was to announce election. The election of the legislature in a representative democracy was seen as a procedure for transferring power from its carrier, i.e. people, to parliamentarians. Much attention was paid to the principles of organization and conduct of elections as a central element of the democratic political process. The right to vote in a democracy was universal, equal, secret, direct, and proportional (the latter concerned elections on party lists). The condition of preservation of democracy was proclaimed to be possible only through "free and unadulterated" elections with statutory punishment of all those that "would violate the purity of elections, in particular, complete freedom of election campaigning; 'impartial control of the legality of the election'; appropriate control of the voting process and counting of votes" (Stakhiv, 1935).

The theorists of Ukrainian socialist oriented political thought of Western Ukraine constructed a model of the future Ukrainian state according to the above described views on the institutional framework of the state. The organization of state power in Ukraine after independence must be a republican form of government and a democratic type of political regime. "Power in the people's labour state can not be monarchist, that is, where there is the royal court of the king with the king's supporters – gentry; this also can not be the power of dictatorial (fascist) that doesn't listen to anyone but only is advised by the military force; it must be the power of the republican, that is chosen by the people and responsible to the people" (Stakhiv, 1936).

The only possible way of forming a government and local governments in the Ukrainian state could only be elections. "Everything should be elected: Ambassadors to the Council of State, advisers to the regional councils, district councils and community councils. Elections must be secret, equal and direct (not through

the voters). Judges, wardens, mayor and priests they all should be elected, not appointed. Only low officials may be called" (Stakhiv, 1935).

The distribution of power providing balance between the branches was proclaimed to be the condition of preservation of democracy and respect for the rights and freedoms of citizens of Ukraine. Particular attention was paid to the priority of human rights and freedoms. Freedom of speech, of social and political organizations, mass actions was seen as a means of public control over the state. "It is not enough to choose the power it is also needed to observe and monitor. In order to be free, criticism should be possible in newspapers, on assemblies and meetings, etc. There should be freedom (the will) to gather in communities and organizations, set up partnerships, go on strike. You can not arrest anyone without a court order. You can not force anyone to go to a foreign school, speak a foreign language, or move to another religion" (Stakhiv, 1935). Religious freedoms and the right of national-cultural autonomy were also considered very important, in particular the rights of national minorities regarding the development of the native language that confirmed the civility and tolerance of the Ukrainian socialist oriented political thought of Western Ukraine. The socialists considered it appropriate to eliminate such punishment as the death penalty and life imprisonment (note that today the elimination of the death penalty is a necessary condition of the Council of Europe participating countries).

Ukrainian organized socialism in Western Ukraine in the interwar period (socialist workers' party – the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party) have kept the perspective on social justice and national equality, protection of rights, and also human and nation's freedoms. The moral dilemma in the politics of the socialists was decided in favor of the compatibility of politics and morality. USDP which occupied the left in the political spectrum focused more on social slogans. The ideologues of the party argued that stateless socialist people's national liberation is no less important than social. "Obtaining the national state is a major and immediate goal of the whole policy of an enslaved people, this is its historic to be or not to be" (Levyns'kyi, 1923).

Conclusion

Summarizing, we can state that theorists of Ukrainian socialist oriented political thought of Western Ukraine made a certain contribution to the development of political science, in particular, the perspective of the state and its forms. Classification of political regimes into democratic and undemocratic which is based on the

analysis of common characteristics of fascist and communist ideologies and political regimes of the Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union defined the characteristics of totalitarianism long before this phenomenon was recognized in contemporary political science.

It made scientific contributions to the study of forms of government, separation of powers and system of control and balances between its branches, state-political institutions of the President, Parliament and government, the problems of rights and freedoms, and the electoral process. The Ukrainian state was seen by socialists as socialist in content and national in form of a democratic Republic with broad powers of local governments, fair and transparent elections, political and ideological pluralism, and the priority of rights and freedoms. Certainly, all the above-mentioned testifies to the maturity of the Ukrainian political thought of the interwar period and a high level of scientific analysis of its theoreticians.

Different ideological directions of the Ukrainian political thought in Western Ukraine in the interwar period of the twentieth century require further investigation as to the subject entity and the classification of forms of the state and other political issues.

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The Concept of the Aesthetical Representation of the Political Space

Idea reprezentacji estetycznej przestrzeni politycznej

• Abstrakt •

Istota reprezentacji estetycznej polityki analizowana jest w oparciu o trzy źródła ontologiczne oraz trzy spojrzenia metodologiczne bazujące na estetyce, etyce i psychologii. W artykule poddano analizie ideę reprezentacji estetycznej przestrzeni politycznej oraz sposoby prezentowania politycznej rzeczywistości za pomocą środków estetyzujących. W celu zbadania właściwości sensorycznych estetyzacji polityki jako procesu oraz szeregu zjawisk szczególną uwagę zwrócono na koncepcje symbolu politycznego, metafory politycznej, rytuału politycznego oraz mitu politycznego.

Słowa kluczowe: estetyzacja polityczna, etyka polityczna, psychologia polityczna, symbol polityczny, metafora polityczna, mit polityczny, rytuał polityczny, reprezentacja estetyczna, ocena polityczna

• Abstract •

The entity of the aesthetical representation of politics is studied basing on three ontological sources and three methodological views on this process: aesthetical, ethical, and psychological. The essence of the aesthetical presentation of the political sphere and the ways of representing political reality by aesthetical facilities are analyzed. The special concepts of a political symbol, the political metaphor, the political ritual, and the political myth are used in the research to discover the sensual parameters of the political aesthetization as the process and collection of the phenomena.

Keywords: political aesthetics, political ethics, political psychology, political symbol, political metaphor, political myth, political ritual, aesthetical representation, political judgment

Introduction

The aim of this research is to study the concept and the methodology, describing a possibility, potential forms, nature and essence of the aesthetical representation of the political life.

The tasks connected with this aim are:

- to define the notions of *representation*, *aesthetical representation of the political sphere* and *political aesthetization*;
- to propose the synthetically scientific approach to the study of aesthetical representation of the political sphere;
- to study *political aesthetization* as a method of political representation, its subject/object structure, functions and forms;
- to analyze the immanent formational and transformational properties of the political aesthetization process.

The research deals with the fields of the political science, philosophy, and psychology and is based on the interdisciplinary approach. First of all, the subject of the research is the content of the political consciousness, the process of the political judgments' formation, and the interrelations between the rational and irrational beginnings of the politics in the process of the political representation in the aesthetical way.

The special concepts of a *political symbol*, *the political metaphor*, *the political ritual* and *the political myth* are used in the research to discover the sensual parameters of the political aesthetization as the process and collection of the phenomena.

The main problems of this research are the essence of the aesthetical presentation of the political sphere, the ways of representing political reality by aesthetical facilities, the reason of the effective influence of this representation on the process of the political judgments' formation, on the political feelings, beliefs and the political behavior, the subjects and objects of the aesthetical representation, and scientific methods which could be used for the study of the political aesthetization process.

The main hypothesis of the research is the idea of irrational, sensual nature of the political representation, which is realized by the political subjects in the aesthetical forms or the aesthetical technique and manner. The process of the aesthetical representation of the political sphere is the process of the political aesthetization in the forms of *symbolization*, *performance*, *metaphorization*, *ritualization*, and others.

The entity of the aesthetical representation of the politics is studied basing on three ontological sources and three methodological views on this process: aesthetical, ethical, and psychological. On the one hand, aesthetical representation uses the artistic instrument of art, which has an emotional influence on people and includes such forms as rhetorical constructs with the poetical imaginary meaning, ritual actions with theatralization of political relations, and images and symbolical forms of the political ideas and values. On the other hand, the aesthetical repre-

sensation has moral functions as a representational structure of a particular moral system which has an explanation and implicit prescriptions for a suitable behavior type within the frames of this moral system. And at last, aesthetical representation has some psychological conditions and factors, and the process of the political reality aesthetization is analyzed as a complex of psychological processes (e.g. attention, perception, emotional reaction, affects and others).

To define this idea the synthetically methodological view is applied based on Franklin Rudolf Ankersmit's concept of aesthetical representation, Hanna Arendt's idea about aesthetical nature of the political judgment, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the symbolical power, and Rollo May's idea that the psyche works on the basis of similar laws as aesthetics. We use the concepts of *political aesthetics*, *political ethics*, *political symbol*, *political metaphor*, *political myth*, and *political ritual* to describe the sensual features of the political aesthetization, its forms, capacities, and effect on the political consciousness, political judgment, and political behavior.

The Notion of Political Representation

The examples of the aesthetical representation of the political power can be found in any period throughout the history of mankind. For example, in the Medieval Europe the monarchical processions used to get through the social body like the police patrols do it today. The essence of the representation has changed for centuries, but it has always kept a range of special features and characteristics which are of ontological nature.

The works by H. Arendt, P. Bourdieu, R. May (1994), H. Pitkin (1967), F.R. Ankersmit (1996; 2002), R. Arnhem (1997), V. Bushanski (2009), and M. Edelman (1995) seem to contain a deeper and more detailed analysis of the aesthetical aspects of politics.

Political representation is the process of representation of political power and its attributes at the level of mass consciousness by means of replacing political reality by political symbols and images, providing the presence of power functions and/or subjects in the political consciousness forming and circulating political meanings, political judgments, and, finally, political values and behavior patterns. In this article political representation is analysed as aesthetical representation, which can be understood and studied within the frameworks of an interdisciplinary approach, based on the methodology and concepts of political philosophy (political aesthetics and ethics) and political psychology.

Ankersmit (2002) proposes an idea that representation will always present us with an “aesthetic gap” between the represented and the representation; it is in this aesthetic gap that legitimate political power and all political creativity originate.

Political representation is the process of political power and power aspects reproducing and replacing themselves in political consciousness. The process of political representation is formed and realized in two ways: spontaneous or managed/organized and has centers of representative activity and subjectivity with different degrees of the intensity.

The process of political representation has a common ontological origin with the aesthetical representation and is based on the psychological laws used by people to explore the political world being absorbed by it and finally involved in it. Ankersmit thinks that word “representation” can have a relation with both politics and aesthetics (Ankersmit, 2002, p. 33).

Representation and Political Reality

What is the political reality? We have a lot of answers to this question; most of them are the products of philosophical reflection. Political philosophy and political psychology being different fields of knowledge come to correlated conclusions, according to which a political reality is only real within the frames of its recipients, their perceptive abilities, possibilities, and aims of the representative of it. Thus the personal ability of perception and reflection is the condition of political reality and its activation in the political consciousness.

Edelman’s idea of constructive possibilities of aesthetics towards political reality is similar to the idea of F. R. Ankersmit. Edelman supposes that “works of art do not represent <<reality>>, <<the real word>> or <<everyday life>>, even if those terms are taken to carry a specific of meaningful reference. Rather, art creates realities and words. People perceive and conceive in the light of narratives, pictures, and images. That is why art is central to politics, just as it is central to social relationships and to beliefs about nature” (Edelman, 1995, p. 7). According to Ankersmit, political reality is given to us, and then we represent it. He thinks that political representation makes the political reality content (politicians, political ideas, political decisions, and collective will) available or unavailable (Ankersmit, 2002, p. 64).

The result of the aesthetical representation of political reality is the political judgment formation. According to Hanna Arendt’s (Curtis, 1999) ideas, political judgment has aesthetical nature, because it is based on the emotional and sensual

reaction of the viewer of the political scene. Such metaphors as “political theatre”, “political scene”, “political drama”, and others show us the aesthetical emanation of the political phenomena and processes. And this political theatre and scene develop for a viewer with a taste and a judgment’s ability, with values and attitudes. Arendt points to the main goal of the aesthetical representation, which is political judgment formation. A political judgment is connected with an aesthetical judgment ontologically, and it is a judgment of taste.

It should be stressed that O’Sullivan points out Derrida’s thought, that “the discourse of aesthetics as a discourse of/on representation. Aesthetics is deconstructed, and art becomes a broken promise” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 126). The aesthetical nature of representation explicates in the thought of this author, that “...the new media coincide with art: indeed, the new media take on an aesthetic function” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 127).

Murrey Edelman’s (1995) conception includes the idea that “the ideology of the public, or segment of it, along with the aptitude of spokespersons (lawyers, editors, public officials, teachers, and others) for focusing on a particular kind of narrative, shape audience response. Wars become heroic but may also become futile or unnecessary in light of the narratives that depict them” (Edelman, 1995, p. 6).

Activation of the representation process includes psychological processes, working on the principles of the aesthetical exploration of the reality. As to Rollo May’s (1994) idea, aesthetical processes work in accordance with psychological laws. Similar ideas are proposed by Rudolf Arhheim (1997) in his conception of art and visual perception. It means that the psyche works on the basis of sensual feelings, perceptions, and valuations of the reality in personal or collective consciousness. The result of these perceptions is the emotional reaction and behaviour acts, formation of values and behaviour patterns. The aesthetical way of the political reality representation is the way of representative organisation of the reality elements for the realization of political power through formation of emotional loyalty and aesthetic legitimacy. Thus, “...a monarch or dictator may be a more successful and dramatic leader, and therefore a better representative, than an elected member of Parliament. Such a leader calls forth emotional loyalties and identification in his followers, the same irrational and affective elements produced by flags and hymns and marching bands. And, of course, representation seen in this need have little of nothing to do with accurate reflection of the popular will, or with enacting laws desired by people” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 106).

Symbolical Representation of Politics

The conception of symbolical power of Pierre Bourdieu (Swartz, 1998) includes the idea of a symbol's ability to represent and reproduce social reality in the forms of narrative, special social rituals, signs, rhythms, etc.

Hanna Pitkin conducts an analysis of political representation and its symbolical aspects in the book *The Concept of Representation* (1967). Pitkin defines human beings as language-using animals, whose behavior is shaped by their ideas. According to the idea of this research what they do and how they do it depends upon how they see themselves and their world, and this in turn depends upon the concepts through which they see. Pitkin considers the next questions as intimately connected: what "representation" means and how to represent. This scientist stresses the significance of the category as "symbolic" for political thought, we have to understand the way in which symbols represent (Pitkin, 1967, p. 93).

It is necessary to note that Pitkin (1967) pays attention to the differences between representing and symbolizing but studies the symbolical manner of representation. M. Yampolskiy (2004) has a similar idea that symbolizing is not the same as presentation.

Symbolical representation is a representation by symbols, rituals, myths, and metaphors. It realized within the symbolical politics providing. Symbolical representation is based on the properties of a symbol. But "symbols, in contrast, are often said to represent their referent... The fish was a symbol of Christ, but not a representation of him. The artist who painted a fish was not representing (showing) Christ as a fish; he was making no allegations about Christ's appearance. Unlike representations, symbols are not likenesses of their referents, and do not resemble them. They make no allegations about what they symbolize, but rather suggest or express it" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 94).

Pitkin argues that the symbol is, roughly, a substitute for what it represents; but a symbol is not a substitute for what it symbolizes. "Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of what they symbolize" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 97). A symbol cannot be a substitute of a political object, but can be an embodiment of some political ideas, programs, values or even political person. "...The actions of the head of state are merely ceremonial that we consider him as a symbol [...] Such a leader may endanger his status as symbol and embodiment of the whole people if he becomes involved in active, partisan politics" (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102).

Thus, the aesthetical representation of politics is not symbolical, but contains its features and abilities. Aesthetical representation is not an imitation of political

reality. Ankersmit (2002) stresses that aesthetical representation is not mimetic of political reality, but a reproduction of the political reality in the political consciousness.

The Function of Aesthetical Representation of Politics

Aesthetical representation of politics has some important functions arising out of the political and aesthetical nature of this process: substitution of the political power, political or social integration and disintegration, identification, and political power presence procuring. Thus H. Pitkin supposes that “the existence of representation is to be measured by the state of mind, the condition of satisfaction or belief, of certain people, be they the represented or the audience. This makes representation a kind of two-way correspondence; it <<concerns the agreement prevailing between ruler and ruler>>” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 106).

According the idea of P. Bourdieu (Swartz, 1998), symbols are the instruments of “social integration” per excellence, the instruments of cognition and communication. Symbols promote an appearance of consensus as to social world and social order. And not only symbols but also images, performances, rituals, and other aesthetical facilities of political representations can have this integrating function.

One more special function of aesthetization of politics is the creation of political phenomena in real life by creating them in political consciousness. Thus, if the goal is to create a nation, “a single dramatic symbol can achieve this much more effectively than a whole legislature of representatives” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 107).

Murrey Edelman thinks that the models, scenarios, narratives, and images into which audiences for political news translate that news are social capital, not individual intentions. “They come from works of art in all genres: novels, paintings, stories, films, dramas, television sitcoms, striking rumors, even memorable jokes” (Edelman, 1995, p. 3).

According to Edelman, the works of art generate the ideas about leadership, honor, power, bravery, cowardice, altruism, dangers, authority, and other political ideas as well as fantasies, desires about the future that people typically assume to be reflections of their own observations and reasoning. “Art forms are incorporated into governmental processes themselves, influencing authority and subordination. Art creates contestable categorizations of public issues that reflect particular conceptions and particular ways of experiencing contemporary times. And art shapes, displaces, and sometimes supersedes cherished influences upon public policy like voting and lobbying” (Edelman, 1995, p. 3). “Exposure and reaction

to particular art forms is certainly selective, reflecting their degree of availability to various people as well as the intentions and biases of individuals and groups. But even when art reinforces preexisting prejudices, its contribution of images and other symbols is vital" (Edelman, 1995, p. 6).

At last, special addition should be paid to the fact that the results of political representation can take the form of a political concept built in the field of political discourse. Symbols can also take a form of a metaphor and provide the nominalization of political objects, giving them new sense. Thus, aesthetical representation by metaphorization has the function of political discourse organization.

Conclusions

The discussion as to the essence of the political, aesthetical, and symbolical representation is studied in this article, and it is necessary to note that the concept of aesthetical representation of politics reconciles different approaches.

Political representation is the substitution and reproduction of the reality in the political consciousness. It means that political reality only exists in a subjective form and could be activated in the process of contact with personal consciousness. But political presentation is possible through the collective consciousness phenomenon, which required the simplification and elimination of the personal (subjective) attitudes and further creation of the useful conditions for perception of the substitution of the reality like the mass communication processes.

Politics can be considered as a text or discourse of the politics. Politics as a text should be researched by the viewing of the semiotic methodology, constructivism, and content-analysis. But, the results of this research have to be supplemented by the political-aesthetical approach viewing the content of the political discourse is the only top of sensual and valuation iceberg.

People perceive politics not only by rational analysis but also in an irrational way, by feelings, emotions, affects, and impressions, which become factors in political judgments and political values' formation. The ways and means by which politics is represented are possible to be studied. The research contains the methodological approach to realize it.

The political representation of the present time is directed at the representation of the politicians, political ideas, political decisions, political programs, and the state, which make up the content of the political life. This content has to be represented, not only by explanation through rational notions and arguments, but also by images, symbols, metaphors, rituals, and other irrational forms.

Philosophy gives us the instruments to understand the moral limits of this process, but the aesthetical entity seems to be prior to morality. Political representation has a moral measurement, because the object of the representation is positioned in the system of political values and norms by the process of the political judgments' formation. The process of the political judgments' formation is the main goal of the political representation.

The psychology of perception and evaluation gives us the explanation of the process of viewing and understanding of the political reality by the individual and collective consciousness. Psychology can explain how the aesthetical processes work.

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Reviews





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Michał Heller, Aleksander Niekricz, *Utopia u władzy. Historia Związku Sowieckiego*, Vol. 1: *Od narodzin do wielkości*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 535; Vol. 2: *Od potęgi do upadku*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 723

It is difficult to understand why we had to wait for the first official Polish edition of *Utopia in Power* for so long. The book, originally published in French and Russian in 1982, is known to Polish readers through more than 20 independent and emigration editions, today difficult to reach because many copies, printed on bad paper, scattered with time. I read this book for the first time as a barely readable copy of a copy of one of the underground edition, when we were preparing for an exam in the History of the Twentieth Century. We immediately understood the importance of this book, although many facts disclosed by Heller and Nekrich were then commonly known. That is great that I can put on my shelf a good Polish edition now, not only because it recalls academic period in my life, but because *Utopia...* is still one of the most important and necessary books to learn about and – equally important – to understand the Soviet Union and Russia. It is worth noting that the first Polish official edition of *Utopia...* is

translated by Andrzej Mietkowski, who prepared this translation for the first time for the Polonia Publishing House in London as soon as it appeared in the original. Mietkowski could personally confront his efforts with Mikhail Heller, who was his neighbor in Paris.

Heller and Nekrich did not try to maintain scientific objectivity. They present their assessment of the facts openly and clearly, calling the Soviet Union the most inhumane system in the history. They do not nuance, do not look for excuses, do not show different points of view. This book was published in the West in the late Brezhnev era, not only as a textbook of unknown history, but as a loud warning against the Soviet Union and against mechanisms that can work in other places in the world quite well.

The case when the historical synthesis of epochs or states brings some exciting discoveries happens extremely rare. The overview books are good space for polemics, revision of the facts, or a way of paying

more attention to the events and characters marginalized already. Here it is different, as the Heller and Nekrich's book reveals many unknown or silenced facts. It must be emphasized that these were not only deeply hidden facts known to several people, written in inaccessible documents. These were the facts that the Russians did not want to remember, they knew these facts, from their own experience or hearsays, but they wanted to forget about them. The truth is not always a liberation, it is often a great and painful burden. The Russians know very well that sometimes it is better to see nothing, hear nothing, and, what perhaps is most important, to be quiet. However, the authors of *Utopia...* had no doubt that the truth is necessary for the Russians, and for the world.

In their book, Heller and Nekrich attempted to estimate the number of victims of Soviet terror, slave laborers and GULAGs' prisoners, proving that – in spite of the Soviet propaganda – it was North who embarked on the war in Korea. Especially they devoted a lot of space to the Katyń massacre. They were among the first who proved, without a doubt, that Russians were guilty of the murder of thousands of Polish officers. Especially shocking to the reader from the beginning of the 1980s were these fragments of *Utopia...* which described the cooperation between the USSR and the Third Reich and the mutual influence of Soviet communism and German national fascism. Heller and Nekrich follow, with passion of detectives, obvious similarities of the two systems and the coincidence of their decisions and actions. In Poland, with the experience of WWII, it was well known and obvious, but only *Utopia...* showed the true dimension of this mutual fascination. In the West, not to mention the Soviet Union itself, the im-

age of the USSR as the Hitler's victim was still widespread.

Describing the reality of the Soviet Union and analyzing the working of the system which was his base, Heller and Nekrich, sometimes literally and directly, raise the questions "how was it possible?", and "who was to blame?". The answer is not always possible to give – not because they could not find it, but because the Soviet system has surpassed the possibilities of human perception and imagination, even those accustomed to the atrocities of the twentieth century.

Utopia... contains many facts that were unknown when the book was published for the first time, and many cutting-edge reflections that are valid even today. But we must remember that the Authors wrote the book on emigration in the late 1970s and early 1980s and they had no access to the secret files that were available, partially and for a short period of time, just several years later. Moreover, we can find in the Bibliography a lot of items that were the basis of the official Soviet history literature. There are also writings of Lenin, Stalin, Marx and Engels. But Heller and Nekrich were able to read them differently, decipher and interpret them anew. Two independent historians could find in the commonly available sources something that the official *hagiographs* could not notice.

Utopia in Power begins at the moment when the World War I broke out. Not because it had to start at some point, but because – as claimed by Heller and Nekrich – this was the real beginning of Bolshevik Russia. The first sentence of the book is: "The October Revolution is a child of World War I" (Vol. I, p. 25). This is one of the most acute and daring opinion in this book: the Soviet Union is not a con-

tinuation of the history of Russia, with its social, cultural, economic and political circumstances, on the contrary, it is a “fatal breaking up in Russian history”. This reflection brings us to very serious consequences. The opinion, widespread in the West in the second half of the twentieth century, that Bolshevism is a continuation of traditions, habits and relationships characteristic only for tsarist Russia, reassured the public, showed the Soviet system as an endemic creature. Heller and Niekrich wanted, by rejecting this view, to demolish this western calm, and warn the world that what happened in Russia after 1917 could happen anywhere and at any time as well.

Covered utopia appears in the book almost immediately – Heller and Niekrich see it as the nature of the system, a condition that allowed it to continue, but also the cause of its birth. “Bolshevism won easily, because it proposed utopia: everything for everyone at once”, they write (Vol. I, p. 79). For the Bolsheviks did not matter that some promises were contrary to their program, e.g., the division of the landlords’ land, which the peasants demanded. Besides, Heller and Niekrich refute the myth that the Bolsheviks fought for power with a clear, orderly and consistent ideological system, internally coherent vision – “For Lenin, there was no doctrines, but only one idea, the idea of power”, the Authors write (Vol. I, p. 49). According to Heller and Niekrich, immediately after the revolution Lenin knew that the public promises have no chance for realization, and the reality does not match the fantasies. He was indeed surprised by the pace of events in Russia after the February Revolution – *Utopia...* presents the Bolshevik revolution as a series of random, spontaneous events, it was not consistently planned and carried out.

The history of the Soviet Union presented in the *Utopia...* is not only a story of terror. Vision of a society broken by terror would be too simple for the Authors, so they effectively seek other means that allowed the Bolsheviks to create their system. For this, the Authors are looking for the guilty abroad, they show how lost was the West in reaction to the Bolshevik coup. Since the 1940s western governments build its policy towards the Soviet Union on the cold calculation of their interests, but in the early years of the communist system they were simply confused, they did not know how to treat the Soviet state, and how to respond to events that were happening there.

Terror has been presented in the pages of *Utopia...*, of course. The Authors describe in detail the forms and – as soon as they can – estimate the scope of terror. Terror has brought incalculable loss, but Heller and Niekrich recognize that it was not an act of madness. Lenin, and especially Stalin, agreed to the extermination of their own citizens without hesitation, saw it not only as way to fight with opponents, but a way to build the society and the Party as obedient and faithful army, some kind of Order. We need to assess the repression in the era of Khrushchev and Brezhnev right in this context – both could use gentler methods not because they were better people, but because Stalin’s terror had reached its goal: destroyed the opposition, changed the composition of society, created a state based on fear.

Heller and Niekrich devoted much attention to succession after Lenin. They recall the facts, known today quite well, indicating that Lenin feared of taking the helm of power by Stalin and warned his comrades against this. However, the Authors of *Utopia...* proved that Stalin was

the leader of the Soviet Union not by chance, or by intrigues, contrary to the intentions of the Leader of the Revolution, but he really was “the legitimate and the only descendant of Lenin” (Vol. I, p. 244). It was Lenin who consciously and systematically created Stalin as a new leader of Bolsheviks’ state, even if he was trying to disinherit his progeny in the end of his life.

As mentioned before, in the time of the first edition of *Utopia...*, particularly interesting for Western readers was the issue of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. Since then, this issue has been described in detail, but it is still worth exploring opinions and assessment presented by Heller and Nekrich. They firmly rejected the idea that the Soviet-German agreements signed in 1939 were necessary for Stalin for strategic reasons, because they gave him time to prepare for war. These agreements, Heller and Nekrich argued, only worsened strategic position of the Soviet Union, leading almost to its collapse. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Treaty on boundaries formed Soviet-German border, measuring more than 3,000 km, and made that a potential aggressor became a direct neighbor of the Soviet Union. Heller and Nekrich believe that the Soviet Union was saved only by the surface area. They recall that the area of Soviet land occupied by the German army in the first weeks of war was comparable with the surface of Western Europe under German occupation. “If the USSR was the size of France or Germany, the mistakes of the party and political leadership would led the country to a total disaster”, they write (Vol. II, p. 215). From the perspective of the strategic mistake of Stalin, per-

petrated in 1939, Heller and Nekrich look at its European policy after the World War II. They argued that the Soviet conquest in Central Europe was not only a political project, the stage of the export of revolution to the West, but a strategic attempt to create a *cordon sanitaire*, the space between the Soviet Union and a strong neighbor, in the event of another war. Soviet foreign policy is the subject of numerous interpretations of the authors of *Utopia...* All the leaders of the Soviet Union sought to ensure that the internal relations keep stillness, be full of stagnation, rightly fearing that any changes will be dangerous for the system. They were looking for the energy needed for the existence of each country and society in international actions. Foreign policy was a substitute for inner activity, just as important, as it helped to unite society around common threats from outside – it reminds us of the modern strategy of Putin’s Russia.

Appalling picture of the Soviet system, presented from the first page to the last, ends with a horribly dismal conclusion: seven decades of Soviet dictatorship, terror and destruction did not bring any achievement, did not improve the situation of Russian society. As well as tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union could not resolve any significant problems, could not fight poverty, could not feed people, could not abolish exploitation, could not solve the problems of nationalities, and the class system turned on caste hierarchy. In this context, the sacrifice of millions of people seems particularly pointless, and the book of Heller and Nekrich becomes a description of the terrifying experiment and, hopefully, a shocking warning.



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Andrzej Leder, *Prześniona Rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej*, Krytyka Polityczna, Warszawa 2014, pp. 205

The history of the Polish nation is not simple. Over the years Poles struggled with the invasions of enemies, three partitions and uprisings which sometimes should not be mentioned due to the bloodshed. First our grandparents and then our parents experienced war which clearly afflicted the world in the 20th century. The communist oppression was the next stage of the fight for survival, and then came the revolution. It was breaking away from the claws of the cold real socialism, winning freedom and democracy, which in 2015, celebrated its 25th anniversary. However, a question arises whether the revolution which took place at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, was not preceded by another revolution? The revolution that was dreamed by Poles? Such a question Andrzej Leder raises in a book entitled: *Prześniona Rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej* [Dreamed Revolution. Historical logic training], published by Krytyka Polityczna publishing house. Andrzej Leder is a professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish

Academy of Sciences. He is also known as the author of books: *Przemiana mitów, czyli życie w epoce schyłku. Zbiór esejów* (1997); *Nieświadomość jako pustka* (2001); *Nauka Freuda w epoce Sein und Zeit*. A. Leder is involved in the philosophy of culture and by *Prześniona Rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej*, he tries to present to the reader what has shaped Poles and what has had an impact on the present attitude.

The main thesis of the book is that between 1939–1956 a social revolution took place on the Polish lands, in particular a bourgeois revolution, which “was made by the Others without the possibility for the most subjective parts of the nation to equate with decisions, actions and responsibility for what happened. As a result, the revolution was experienced by the Polish society as a dreadful dream”. According to A. Leder, this revolution was exceptionally brutal and catastrophic. It clearly took over human consciousness, changing them completely. The unrealized revolution was one of those events that according to the

author have changed the thinking of the Polish society and brought Poles closer to the citizens' awareness of the Western countries. The author draws attention to the fact that all Poles' needs that were connected with socio-structural changes had been carried out without their awareness and without them present, i.e. wiping the Jewish community and fall of the higher classes. According to the author, the foundations of the revolution at the turn of 1980s and 1990s, the birth of the Solidarity movement and creation of the middle class society was triggered by hatred and terror. The hate was directed mainly at all Jews and the terror was introduced by the Stalinist authorities.

The introduction of the reviewed book refers to the objective which the author set for himself, and which the reviewer mentioned above. A. Leder presents also the terminology which he later uses in the presentation of the dreamed revolution. He uses the terminology associated with psychoanalysis such as the field or fantasy that is presented in a clear, comprehensive way even for a layperson. In the text the reader can also see the concept of imagination, understood by Charles Taylor as something that would allow social practices by giving them a peculiar sense. Therefore, the first advantage of reading this book is the fact that first the readers can familiarize themselves with the concepts, then try to immerse in their meaning and importance, and finally together with the author can juxtapose them with a particular situation, which took place in recent history. Then, A. Leder presents the main thesis that was already mentioned at the beginning by the reviewer.

In the next section the author focuses on the Holocaust, which according to A. Leder was one of the key parts of the

revolution. The Holocaust seems to be an undoubtedly inconvenient and difficult subject for Poles. A. Leder shows the relationship that prevailed between the Jews and Poles as cold. The author's claims concerning the relations are followed by quotes and reminiscences of those times. The author of *Dreamed Revolution* mentions the situation that the properties of Jews were taken over by Poles. He also indicates the absence of empathy toward the Jewish community during the German occupation.

Undoubtedly, the author touches upon extremely important parts of the history of the Polish nation, the shaping of the values in the society. However, the reviewer would like to point out that this part of the work lacks of balance. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that there were many historical events which contradict the above claims. In this period present were associations that dealt with granting aid to members of the Jewish community, which suggests that the author's argument about the lack of empathy may not be entirely valid.

However, the reviewer agrees with the book summary which the author presented at the end of this part. In particular, it points to the factors connected with citizens' unconscious and denying sense of guilt with regard to the situation of the Jewish community in the years 1939–1945. It formed some values of the Polish society and a significant lack of trust between themselves, due to the fact that historical experiences have taught Poles to assess the situation in an unequivocal way, without the possibility of analysis.

The next part A. Leder devotes to agricultural reform also called by him the industrial terror. It depicts the reform which took place in the Polish lands and

presenting this the author has in mind the change of Poles mentality together with the system change. In the society the ideal nobleman was changed to the ideal party official member. A. Leder relates directly to the extermination of noble imagination by the gentry imagination of the communist government. The gentry were exterminated just like the elite that were deeply rooted in the Polish society and primarily peasants had benefited from this. As A. Leder points out, the destruction of gentry did not in any way cause a creation of a new symbolic field in its place. The communist authorities in Poland, despite extensive authority, failed to convince the public enough to create something new. The elimination of the elite lasted just as the destruction of the Jews since 1939 and according to A. Leder had an impact on the development of the Polish society.

In the last part the author attempts to address the dreamed revolution that took place during the period 1939–1956 by the prospect of the next thirty three years of Polish People's Republic. The author indicates the situation where the revolution made by foreign hands, made the Polish society incapable of being subjective again. Undoubtedly, he also indicates an important issue that if the society does not critically review this revolution, which took place in a dream, it will not be able to reach its roots, create own values, and consequently it will be unable to find its real social identity.

Prześlona Rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej consists of several parts. It starts with a few pages of introduction.

The first part pertains to the revolution. In the next part the author refers to the Holocaust and in subsequent parts to the reform of agricultural policy and the industrial terror as the author named it. The layout of Leder's book is consistent. It contains logical arguments and prompts reader to think. As the reviewer mentioned before, the book lacks a reference to the previously mentioned aid for the Jews during the German occupation. However, this is only a small drawback. Undoubtedly, the narration created by the author deserves recognition. The narration is not straightforward, but it does not put the reader off. On the contrary, it encourages reflection. It should be added that the author creating this book used a huge amount of various sources which allow the reader to immerse in the period discussed by A. Leder.

Undoubtedly, it is a book which provokes reflection. It presents events that appear to be "prehistoric" for the youngest generations because they represent the source of transformation in the society and the values that currently drive the society. Furthermore, it also justifies the absence of identity in the citizens who through the widespread ignorance cannot find their identity and, as also indicated by A. Leder, cannot trust themselves.

Prześlona Rewolucja. Ćwiczenia z logiki historycznej is a book worth recommending not only because of the fact that it presents a completely different historical and social vision. Moreover, it also presents the debate about this period and processes that took place in the 1940s and 1950s and their consequences.



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Michael Sandel, *Przeciwko udoskonalaniu człowieka. Etyka w czasach inżynierii genetycznej*, Wydawnictwo Kurhaus Publishing, Warszawa 2014, pp. 125

In recent decades an increase of the meaning of bioethical cases in political debates could be observed. They have been started in 1970 by *Roe v. Wade* abortion case and, since then, included topics such as euthanasia, in vitro fertilization, and human enhancement. A common feature of all these cases is that they all, more or less, concern the matter of life, death, and human nature. That feature is also the main source of mutual misunderstanding between debating people because they all base their arguments, convictions, and judgements on different concepts of life, death, and human nature. For some of them, life is God's gift and death is a moment when God takes a human's soul away. In this group, some claim that if life comes from God, it would be wrong to manipulate it by, e.g. genetic engineering, while the others claim that if life is a gift, hence it belongs to us, we should use it to the maximum and make it better. Obviously, there are other people who argue that death is not a moment, but a process, and that presupposition lets them seek

for criteria and arguments in favour of euthanasia or earlier organ transplantations. Irrespective of the case we choose to discuss, we can notice that in all biopolitical debates people represent different rationalities, hence use different arguments that not always match each other. For instance, it is very likely that a person who uses arguments referring to religious beliefs represents illogical, dogmatic or paradigmatic rationality while a person who uses secular arguments represents any other kind of rationality or dogma/paradigm in the aforementioned ones. The outcome however is always the same. If both sides of debate represent different rationalities, they cannot reach the point of mutual consensus. Nevertheless, some authors argue that the problem lies not in the variety of rationalities and that reaching the consensus would be possible if we had more explicit arguments to use in biopolitical debates.

One of these authors is a famous American political philosopher, Michael Sandel. Although he is known mainly for his lectures on justice and communitarian

criticism of liberalism, he had an episode (2002–2005) in The President's Council on Bioethics (PCBE) where he has met other famous authors who shared his anxieties about the use of biotechnology, such as Francis Fukuyama or Leon Kass. Initially, a scientific result of Sandel's participation in PCBE was a short essay on genetic engineering but being convinced by his colleagues Sandel extended it and published it as a book about genetic engineering, its place in the modern societies and political deliberations upon it. The reviewed here *Przeciwko udoskonalaniu człowieka* (its original title is *The Case Against Perfection* – for the sake of linguistic coherence I will be using it in the remainder), however, is not entirely a new stage in Sandel's work. It is rather a peculiar continuation, though concerning the new topics, of his previous thoughts present in *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (1998), *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1998), *Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics* (2005) and some kind of a starting point to his next books: *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* (2010) and *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (2012). For the sake of simplicity we can say that Sandel's main idea in all his works basically remained the same, that if we are by nature encumbered to any kind of community, there is no possibility that we could always make free, independent and "conscious" choices, and that made him perceiving a community and preserving it as valuable. What was different, however, was how Sandel argued his conviction.

In *The Case Against Perfection* the author proposed us two things: to assume that biotechnological procedures do not raise any of our moral disagreements and to look not at the biotechnological *means*

but at *aims* to which the means are used. Then he asked us to consider if and, if yes, how these procedures deprive us our freedom and humanity (p. 31). In more general terms, Sandel's main aim in the reviewed book was to help us express our anxieties about the long-term social or political goals of *using* biotechnology in the form of well-constructed, bioconservative argumentation that would share a common ground of rationality with transhumanists' (or other bioliberals') argumentation and could firmly stand against it. Did he succeed?

To answer this question we have to assume that it can be answered positively only if the author was able to elaborate other kind of argumentation than the one based on intuitions, i.e. irrational fears. It is that way because in the biopolitical debates "bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions" (Roache, 2001). Yet at the very beginning of the book, the author has made the task harder to himself by claiming that the argument of autonomy is insufficient in biopolitical debates (because it is based on the false premise that children who are not enhanced are always able to make free and independent choices). So, what did he propose to overcome this theoretical obstacle? In the five chapters referring to the different topics concerning various applications of human enhancement techniques Sandel deliberated on the shape of societies pursuing children enhancement (chapters 1 and 3), possible changes in our perception of sport disciplines (chapter 2) and changes of our attitudes towards other people assuming that we had an enhancement procedure (chapters 4 and 5). The author started his task by answering to an apparently simple question. What is the

difference between medical treatment that requires a genetic modification of human body and a procedure that is focused only on improving someone's body and capabilities? We could answer that the difference is in the initial intention of having such a procedure, but the possible outcomes eventually remain a mystery. Sandel however seemed to be more daring in predicting them. He claimed that the permission to use enhancements always leads to the rise of two groups of people – those who have and those who have not an access to the enhancing technology. In his opinion, it always causes that people lose their humanity. Why? The author tried to explain it on the example of sportsmen. According to him, we admire their unusual capabilities and an effort they take to win a competition, but, first of all, we admire their congenital talents. Using technology to equalise sportsmen's chances would make us admire the artistry of pharmacists, says Sandel, instead of the natural talents of athletes (p. 33). However, the central point of Sandel's argument of losing humanity concerned not that that people will become equal but a fear that the possible increase of inequality between them will cause a decrease of meaning of three social values they all share, namely humility, responsibility, and solidarity (p. 79). The author argued that we are not able to be humble if we can control risk factors present in our lives; and that we cannot be responsible for our successes if we achieved them due to enhancements. Finally, he argued that we are solidary only if we cannot achieve a chosen aim individually, hence being perfect and able to act separately would certainly deprive us the potentiality of being solidary.

The reviewed book had a great potential of becoming the first serious theo-

retical opposition to the claims of transhumanists and other bioliberals. This potential, however, was wasted in the moment in which Sandel introduced the categories of life as a gift and giftedness. The author was aware that "speaking of a gift presupposes a giver" (p. 84) and that the "giver" is unambiguously identified as God. Hence, to prove his arguments as valid means to prove the existence of God in the first place. Sandel tried to overcome this theoretical obstacle by claiming that appreciating the value of life as a gift is possible even without presuming that the giver is God. We cannot, however, accept this claim because it obviously is a logical fallacy, a classical *petitio principii*. Unfortunately for the argumentation in the book, it was almost entirely based on that premise. One can ask if one logical mistake can ruin all the author's effort? Usually no but the case of the reviewed book was different from the very beginning. Let me remind that Sandel's main aim in *The Case Against Perfection* was to propose the argumentation that would be based on the other premises than the "intuitive" ones. Meanwhile, not only the main assumption but all arguments in the book are based on more or less general intuitions and irrational fears about the future. The additional proof to that statement is that the author many times stated that although he tried to explain why we feel anxious about using biotechnology, it usually was not possible (p. 17, 19, 21, 24, 29, 31, 48, 60, 77, 84, 85, 86). Therefore, the realisation of Sandel's main goal was a failure, though not entirely. The author certainly helped us to understand the bioconservative way of reasoning in political debates on human enhancement cases, and then the bioconservative thinking in general. In my opinion, the latter fact alone is sufficient

enough to recommend the book to every person interested in the upcoming changes of our understanding what is political. Also, Sandel's book can certainly serve as a guide to religious believers how to declare their anxieties about human enhancement more clearly. But the greatest importance of Sandel's work is that it explicitly expresses a need of creating arguments that would be based less on intuitive and more

on rational grounds, so they could be used to accurately defend the bioconservative beliefs and interests in the present and upcoming biopolitical debates.

References:

- Roache, R. (2009). Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and the Wisdom of Reflecting on Repugnance. *Monash Bioethics Review*, 28(1), 4.1–4.21.

